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In the wake of the deteriorating relations between the former Allies of the Second World 
War, several European countries, the United States of America, and Canada came 
together to provide for their security and in 1949 formed a unique security alliance, the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization. In addition to its collective defense function, the 
creators of NATO also paid attention to community building among the alliance 
members. After reconciliation with its former enemies, the re-armed Germany was 
allowed to join this community even though it had caused the Second World War. These 
observations lead to the question of the importance of community and reconciliation for 
the creation and success of NATO.  
 On the other hand, Northeast Asia, which had also been severely affected by 
Japanese colonialism and the Pacific War, did not evolve into an area of peace and 
security. This situation might be even more surprising given the number of existing 
forums dealing with security issues. This thesis examines the possibility of NATO-like 
security cooperation in Northeast Asia that features community building aspects and 
reconciliation, both of which are assumed to be normative prerequisites of a security 
community. 
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
In the light of the successful North Atlantic security cooperation and the volatile 
security environment in Northeast Asia (NEA), this thesis asks if insights from the North 
Atlantic experience can be applied to NEA. One of these insights (detailed in this thesis) 
is the emergence of a shared identity among the countries that created the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO). When they came together in 1949 to collectively protect 
themselves from a threat posed by the Soviet Union, they also aimed at creating a 
security community based on a shared identity. The second insight is that Germany could 
not have joined NATO without its serious efforts to reconcile with most of its former war 
time enemies and victims of the Nazi regime. 
The thesis looks to answer this central question by addressing several subordinate 
questions: What were the origins of the North Atlantic security cooperation and to which 
degree were a shared identity and reconciliation among its member states a necessary 
element of its creation and success?  What is the degree of reconciliation in NEA 
between Japan, the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and the Republic of Korea 
(ROK)? To what degree has a shared identity developed in East Asia? Are shared identity 
and reconciliation a prerequisite for NATO-like security cooperation in NEA? 
B. IMPORTANCE  
After having fought two World Wars in the 20th century, several European 
countries, the United States of America (U.S.), and Canada came together to provide for 
their security and in 1949 formed a unique security alliance, NATO. This alliance was a 
“hybrid organization: one that maintained collective security against the Soviet Union 
and actively pursued the construction of a trans-Atlantic community of nations.”1 
Although fascism in Germany had caused the outbreak of the Second World War, the 
devastation of Europe and millions of dead, the re-armed country acceded to this 
                                                 
1 Mary N. Hampton, “NATO at the Creation. U.S. Foreign Policy, West Germany and the Wilsonian 
Impulse,” Security Studies 4, no. 3 (1995), 610–11. 
 2 
community in 1955. In spite of the assumption of some realist scholars of international 
relations, NATO outlasted the end of the Cold War; it also integrated former opponents 
from the Warsaw Pact as new members, and the continuity of the alliance does not seem 
to be in question.  
NEA, which had also been severely affected by Japanese colonialism and the 
Pacific War, nevertheless did not have such a long tradition of great power rivalries that 
emerged in Europe with the Thirty Years’ War and continued thereafter for nearly 300 
years. But while the North Atlantic region has developed into an area of peace and 
security since the Second World War, NEA:  
encompasses a diverse mix of rival great powers, thorny territorial 
disputes, unresolved historical memories … The unsettled relations … 
would be a challenge to manage even if the region had well-established 
governance institutions – but the absence of strong and coherent regional 
security institutions makes the challenge even greater.2 
This situation might be even more surprising given the number of existing forums 
dealing with security issues such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) or the East Asia 
Summit (EAS). This thesis aims to propose the shape of future security cooperation in 
NEA by looking for the existence of a shared identity and assessing the degree of 
reconciliation among these nations. Both of these conditions are normative prerequisites 
of a security community as demonstrated by the formation and success of the North 
Atlantic security cooperation. The importance of these prerequisites in the NATO case 
and their possible distinct impacts on security cooperation in NEA have not received 
much scholarly attention. 
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
A first hypothesis is that the creation of the North Atlantic security cooperation 
was fostered by the invocation of a North Atlantic region, inhabited by people who share 
a common set of norms and values and who positively identify with each other. Without 
this shared identity among its members, NATO would have existed only as a deterrent 
                                                 
2 G. John Ikkenberry and Jitsuo Tsuchiyama, “Between Balance of Power and Community: the Future 
of Multilateral Security Co-operation in the Asia-Pacific,” International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 2 
(2002), 69–70. 
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against the Soviet Union. If that were the case, then the aspect of shared identity would 
be of no importance for NEA. Furthermore, with no single aggressor comparable to the 
Soviet Union, the NEA community would have no common threat from which to protect 
themselves.  
The second hypothesis considers the importance of Germany’s reconciliation 
efforts with its wartime enemies and victims of the Nazi regime as a necessary 
prerequisite for its inclusion in the North Atlantic community of nations and NATO. If 
Germany had been integrated into NATO merely because of its geostrategic importance 
as a bulwark against the Soviet armies, then reconciliation would not have mattered. 
Thus, reconciliation would not be a prerequisite for a possible NEA security cooperative. 
Any perceived threat would force these countries to cooperate, no matter what their 
perception of each other is. 
The third hypothesis is that effective institutionalized security cooperation in 
NEA remains a challenge because it would entail some degree of curtailment of national 
sovereignty. Without a shared positive identity as Northeast Asians, these nations cannot 
cooperate under these terms. Countries in the region, and the PRC in particular, 
emphasize their sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs by other states. A 
curtailment of national sovereignty, however, would be necessary, for example, to create 
integrated military command structures as is the case for NATO. 
As an amalgamation of the first three hypotheses, the thesis examines how shared 
identity and reconciliation are necessary prerequisites for an NEA security cooperative 
that would be comparable to NATO. This thesis evaluates the degree to which these 
conditions are present in NEA and the impact of these conditions on the creation of a 
NATO-like security cooperative among these nations. 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
To answer the numerous questions raised in this thesis it is necessary to consult 
literature on various topics. These topics include the origins of NATO; a look at the status 
of reconciliation in NEA between Japan on the one side, the PRC and the ROK on the 
other; an assessment of the level of a shared identity in NEA; and a discussion of the 
 4 
prospects for and the shape of a future security cooperative in this region based on the 
North Atlantic experience.  
With regard to the origins of NATO, the dominant explanation is the realist 
paradigm arguing for the birth of NATO in response to the threat posed by the Soviet 
Union. This contrasts to explanations that see in NATO the creation of a value-based 
community of like-minded democracies that aimed to preserve peace and prosperity in a 
shared transatlantic region. As Timothy P. Ireland writes, “Traditionally, in analyses of 
the North Atlantic Treaty (NAT) and NATO, American historians have concentrated on 
the development of the ‘cold war’ between the United States and the Soviet Union.”3  
Also Sean Kay argues that “the primary reason for NATO’s founding was the Soviet 
challenge in Eastern Europe. NATO was an alliance created in response to a threat.”4 
These assessments are underlined by comments from high-ranking U.S. politicians who 
were present at the creation of NATO, including Secretary of State Dean Acheson, who 
said in 1966, “The plain fact, of course, is that NATO is a military alliance. Its purpose 
was and is to deter and, if necessary, to meet the use of Russian military power or the fear 
of its use in Europe.”5 Promoting the second strand of explanation, Mary N. Hampton 
argues “a central belief … that formed a key U.S. security objective was that a trans-
Atlantic community … must be constructed. This belief preceded the American drive to 
balance against the Soviet.”6 Making his first public comments as secretary of state, 
Dean Acheson also argued in this way in 1949:  
We North Atlantic peoples share a common faith in fundamental human 
rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the principles of 
democracy, personal freedom and political liberty … We believe that 
these principles and this common heritage can best be fortified and 
preserved and the general welfare of the people of the North Atlantic 
                                                 
3 Timothy P. Ireland, Creating the Entangling Alliance. The Origins of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1981), 4. 
4 Sean Kay, NATO and the Future of European Security (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 1998), 31. 
5 Ibid., 32. 
6 Hampton, “NATO at the Creation,” 611. 
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advanced by an arrangement for cooperation in matters affecting their 
peace and security and common interests.7  
Hampton arrives at her view after assessing what she calls the Wilsonian impulse, 
a set of ideas of the former U.S. president, and how these affected the behavior of U.S. 
policymakers after the Second World War. She identifies the existence of a positive 
security identity and attributes a significant impact on state behavior to this identity in the 
sense that it brought the founding members of NATO together against Russia, but it also 
ensured that the members of the alliance did not go to war against each other.8  
Current literature acknowledges this dual nature of NATO and adds even more 
facets to the need for its creation like threats through fragile economies, weak political 
systems, or rising nationalism.9 But the literature on the origins of NATO is 
comparatively young and was more or less completely absent for the first forty years of 
the alliance. This might have been caused by the perception that the creation of NATO 
simply was the logical consequence of containment policy and the Cold War, and that, 
therefore, the reasons for NATO’s origins were clear and explored to a sufficient 
extent.10 The end of the Cold War, nevertheless, did not see the collapse of NATO and 
made people ask why this was so. Literature about the early history and maybe deeper 
origins of NATO flourished to some extent through the 1990s, but since Gustav 
Schmidt’s multi-volume edition of 2001 about NATO’s first fifty years, the dedicated 
occupation with NATO’s origins disappeared, and reference to its origins might be given 
in works on other NATO-related topics.  
                                                 
7 Kay, NATO and the Future of European Security, 30. 
8 Mary N. Hampton, “NATO, Germany, and the United States: Creating Positive Identity in Trans-
Atlantia,” Security Studies 8, nos. 2–3 (1998), 235–36. 
9 See Kay, NATO and the Future of European Security, 31–34; John English, “Who Could Ask for 
More? North American Perspectives on NATO’s Origins,” in A History of NATO–The First Fifty Years, 
vol. 2, ed. Gustav Schmidt (Basingstoke, New York: Palgrave, 2001), 320; John R. Gillingham, 
“Introduction,” in NATO: The Founding of the Atlantic Alliance and the Integration of Europe, ed. Francis 
C. Heller and John R. Gillingham (New York, St. Martin’s Press: 1992), 1. 
10 Lawrence S. Kaplan, “After Forty Years. Reflections on NATO as a Research Field,” in NATO: The 
Founding of the Atlantic Alliance and the Integration of Europe, ed. Francis H. Heller and John R. 
Gillingham (New York, St. Martin’s Press: 1992), 16. 
 6 
The matter of reconciliation in NEA between Japan, the PRC, and the ROK is a long-
standing issue. The relations between these countries are still strained by the history of 
Japan’s colonial past and the memories of the Pacific War. This strain is measured by 
reaction in these countries to Japanese textbooks, the visits of Japanese politicians to the 
Yasukuni shrine, the issue of comfort women, or territorial disputes.11 The available 
literature emphasizes that Japan has to overcome its habit of public excuses to its 
neighbors, while at the same time undercutting these excuses at home. The government 
continues to assert domestically that the Pacific War was started by a politico-military 
clique in Japan and emphasizes the victimhood of the Japanese people, assertions which 
must cease as a prerequisite for true reconciliation.12 While some scholars recognize that 
the U.S. occupation forces fostered this Japanese attitude after the end of the Pacific 
War13, and even add that U.S. decisions “contributed to the vicious circle regarding 
Japan’s inability to reconcile and reintegrate itself into postwar Asia,”14 the majority of 
the literature sees the continuing enmities between Japan, the PRC, and the ROK as 
rooted in the rise of nationalism, especially in the PRC and the ROK.15 The more 
detailed consideration of the conflict between the PRC and Japan as result of their 
                                                 
11 For coverage of these issues in Chinese media see Jiangang Huo, “Where Are Sino-Japanese 
Relations Headed?: Japanese Prime Minister Is Reshaping a Tough Japan at the Cost of Relations with 
Neighboring Countries,” Beijing Review 48, no. 44 (2005); Ying Ding, “Textbook Outcry: Japan Adds 
New Tension to Its Already Strained Relations with Its Asian Neighbors by Approving a New Textbook,” 
Beijing Review 48, no. 15 (2005); Zhitao Ding, “Diplomatic Deep Freeze: South Koreans Have Been 
Completely at Odds With Japanese Over a Series of Disputed Issues Recently,” Beijing Review 48, no. 15 
(2005), 19. 
12 Kazuko Mori, “New Relations between China and Japan: a Gloomy, Frail Rivalry,” Modern Asian 
Studies Review 2 (2007), 63. 
13 Mariko Tsujata, “A Fragile Balance between ‘Normalization’ and the Revival of Nationalistic 
Sentiments,” in War and Militarism in Modern Japan: Issues of History and Identity, ed. Guy Podoler 
(Folkstone: Global Oriental, 2009), 190. 
14 Victor D. Cha, “Powerplay. Origins of the U.S. Alliance System in Asia,” International Security 34, 
no. 3 (Winter 2009/10), 194. 
15 See Mori, “New Relations between China and Japan,” 60; John Swenson-Wright, “The Limits to 
‘Normalcy’: Japanese-Korean Post-Cold War Interactions,” in Japan as a ‘Normal Country’?: A Nation in 
Search of its Place in the World, ed. Yoshihide Soeya, Masayuki Tadokoro and David A. Welch (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 2011), 172; Jianwei Wang, “Chinese Discourse on Japan as a ‘Normal 
Country,’” in Japan as a ‘Normal Country’?: A Nation in Search of Its Place in the World, ed. Yoshihide 
Soeya, Masayuki Tadokoro and David A. Welch (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2011), 122. 
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struggle for regional dominance16 and the abuse of historical issues for domestic 
reasons,17 adds to the critical observation of the history issue in NEA. 
The literature, nevertheless, overemphasizes the failure of Japan to seriously come 
to terms with its past and does not greatly address the need for a willingness in the PRC 
and the ROK to genuinely accept the Japanese apologies.  
The literature on the level of integration in East Asia asserts that countries in the 
region (and NEA as its sub-region) have been brought together through increased 
economic exchanges and economic interdependency, underlined by figures of the 
increase in intra-regional trade since the 1980s, and that institutionalized cooperation on a 
functional basis has increased (such as the Chiang Mai Initiative or the Asian Bond 
Initiative),18 but that community building on the basis of shared identity and values is 
still under-articulated.19 The challenge to an NEA identity lies in the still high level of 
national identity and the challenge to find common goals while at the same time solving 
historical issues.20 What seems to be a preference of East Asians is to gradually increase 
cooperation through dialogue rather than to agree to the establishment of overly legalistic 
institutions;21 East Asians seem to prefer networks rather than institutions that, 
nevertheless, lead to many informal security dialogues.22 On the other hand, several 
                                                 
16 Ibid. 
17 Chung-in Moon, “Truth and Reconciliation in East Asia: A South Korean Perspective,” Global 
Forum on Civilization and Peace Committee, ed. 2008, Civilization and Peace (Seongnam-si: Academy of 
Korean Studies, 2009), 549. 
18 Jimbo Kim, “An Emerging East Asian Community? The Political Process of Regionalism in East 
Asia,” in An East Asian Community and the United States, ed. Ralph A. Cossa and Akihiko Tanaka 
(Washington, D.C.: The CSIS Press, 2007), 15. 
19 Melissa G. Curley and Nicholas Thomas, “Advancing East Asian Regionalism: an Introduction,” in 
Advancing East Asian Regionalism, ed. Melissa G. Curley and Nicholas Thomas (New York: Routledge, 
2007), 22. 
20 Aileen San Pablo-Baviera, “ Regionalism and Community Building in East Asia. Challenges and 
Opportunities,” in Advancing East Asian Regionalism, ed. Melissa G. Curley and Nicholas Thomas (New 
York: Routledge, 2007), 244. 
21 Katja Weber and Jonathan Huang, “East Asian Security Revisited in the Light of the European 
Experience,” Issues and Studies 46, no. 1 (2010), 114. 
22 Peter J. Katzenstein, “Introduction: Asian Regionalism in Comparative Perspective,” in Network 
Power. Japan and Asia, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein and Takashi Shiraishi (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1997), 27. 
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institutionalized dialogues (ARF, EAS, Shangri-La Dialogue, Asia Defence Ministers 
Meeting) that roughly deal with the same issues, might lead to competition between these 
and their subsequent paralysis.23 The literature on the level of 
regionalization/institutionalization can be analyzed through its preference on 
(institutionalized) outcome-oriented arrangements or cooperation through (informal) 
dialogue; for the matter of this thesis, the former will be considered as more promising 
for the creation of a North Atlantic-like security cooperative. 
By reviewing the existing frameworks for cooperation and analyzing the driving 
forces behind them, the future of security cooperation in NEA and the shape this might 
take is divided into two basic categories: 
• Security cooperation in NEA will be based on the existing bilateral 
arrangements with little prospect of new ones to emerge (James Schoff, Le 
Bo Linh, Gregg Andrew Brazinsky, Zhang Yunling). 
• Future security cooperation will still be based on bilateralism, but will 
incrementally grow towards multilateralism; this category can be further 
divided up into the scholars who emphasize the coincidental existence of 
various kinds of security cooperation (Shin Wa Lee, Nobuo Okawara, 
Peter Katzenstein, Nick Bisley, Akiko Fukushima), and the ones who 
argue for multilateralism as the preferable way of organization (Raymond 
Jose G. Quilop, Peter van Nees, G. John Ikkenberry, Min Ye). 
Scholars of the first category argue that the current bilateral situation in NEA is 
caused by the lack of a collective identity, distrust, and conflict about historical issues 
between the countries of the region24, and they argue that national interests, differences 
in security awareness, and power maximization present obstacles for politico-military 
cooperation.25 The relationship between Japan and the PRC, in which they see 
themselves as strategic competitors, exemplifies this situation and underlines the lack of 
attractiveness of multilateralism that could help overcome the rivalry between the two 
                                                 
23 Takeshi Yuzawa, “The ASEAN Regional Forum. Challenges and Prospects,” in Routledge 
Handbook of Asian Regionalism, ed. Mark Beeson and Richard Stubbs (New York: Routledge, 2012), 382–
83. 
24 Min Hyong Park, “A Cooperative Security System in Northeast Asia: The ROK’s Strategic 
Choices,” The Journal of East Asian Affairs 25, no. 1 (2011), 87. 
25 Le Bo Linh and Tran Khan, “Existing Foundations for Multilateral Security Cooperation in East 
Asia,” East Asian Review 12 (2008), 72. 
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countries.26 Assuming that the U.S. only encourages multilateral frameworks when these 
arrangements are to its advantage, Brazinsky argues (in contrast to other scholars) that the 
Six-Party-Talks, since they only serve one specific interest, will not be the model for a 
multilateral security framework in the region because there is no overlap in broader 
security interests between the United States and the other countries in the region.27 These 
rather pessimistic estimates for improved security cooperation in NEA conclude with the 
statement that a multilateral cooperative similar to NATO will have no future in NEA28 
and that existing formats should be given preference before the creation of new regional 
institutions.29 
Scholars of the second category, who emphasize the coincidental mix of various 
forms of cooperation, concede that multilateralism due to different national interests, 
historical conflicts, and territorial disputes is only rudimentarily present.30 It is not the 
norm in NEA,31 but part of the prevalent system of bilateral arrangements forged by the 
U.S. and other bilateral relations.32 In fact, national rivalries and power maximization 
have limited the process of further regionalization33 so that multilateral relations will 
only complement rather than substitute for bilateral ones.34 In opposition to this 
restrained enthusiasm towards multilateralism, some scholars urge for multilateralism not 
                                                 
26 Elena Atanassova-Cornelis and Carmen Amado Mendes, “Dynamics of Japanese and Chinese 
Security Policies in East Asia and Implications for Regional Stability,” Asian Politics and Policy 2, no. 3 
(2010), 411. 
27 Gregg Andrew Brazinsky, “The United States and Multilateral Security Cooperation in Northeast 
Asia,” Asian Perspective 32, no. 2 (2008), 22, 35. 
28 Yunling Zhang, Rising China and World Order (Singapore: World Scientific, 2010), 54. 
29 James Schoff, “Future Directions for Northeast Asian Regionalism: New Security and Trade 
Architectures (… with an Emphasis on Security),” Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies 20 (2010), 169. 
30 Shin-Wa Lee, “Construction of a Northeast Asian Community for Regional Security,” East Asian 
Review 19, no. 1 (2007), 69. 
31 Nobuo Okawara and Peter J. Katzenstein, “Japan and Asian-Pacific Security: Regionalization, 
Entrenched Bilateralism and Incipient Multilateralism,” The Pacific Review 14, no. 2 (2001), 182. 
32 Nick Bisley, “China’s Rise and the Making of East Asia’s Security Architecture,” Journal of 
Contemporary China 21, no. 73 (2012), 21. 
33 Akiko Fukushima, “Political and Security Cooperation in East Asia. Promoting Functional 
Cooperation,” in An East Asian Community and the United States, ed. Ralph A. Cossa and Akihiko Tanaka 
(Washington, D.C.: The CSIS Press, 2007), 105–06. 
34 Weber and Huang, “East Asian Security Revisited in the Light of the European Experience,” 115. 
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only as the desirable, but as the ultimate form of cooperation. They argue that only 
multilateralism provides lasting stability,35 that it is the key to security in NEA,36 and the 
structural changes in the region (challenged dominance of the U.S. due to economic 
growth of Asian countries, increase in intra-regional trade relations, change in 
distribution of power) make the existing bilateral arrangements untenable.37 G. John 
Ikkenberry stands out within the literature because he urges for a formal and articulated 
regional security structure and openly argues that the United States should engage the 
PRC in multilateral institutions to contain it and at the same time strengthen its own 
bilateral ties in the region.38 
It must be mentioned that the majority of the reviewed literature dealing with the 
prospects for NEA security cooperation was written in the first decade of the 21st century, 
a period that had seen a downturn in the relations between Japan, the PRC, and the ROK 
under the premiership of Koizumi Junichiro in Japan. It has to be taken into consideration 
that the literature reflects the experiences of this time period and her aftermath and, 
therefore, might have arrived at pessimistic or overly optimistic conclusions. 
With regard to the current mapping of literature that addresses the intersection of 
applying the North Atlantic experiences to NEA, there is some literature that addresses 
the issue from the point of realist and liberal paradigms of international relations, 
focusing on institutions and the distribution of power.39 These contributions all seem to 
focus on the outcomes themselves (i.e., the shape of relations between countries), rather 
                                                 
35 Peter van Nees, “Designing a Mechanism for Multilateral Security Cooperation in Northeast Asia,” 
Asian Perspective 32, no.4 (2008), 125. 
36 Raymond Jose G. Quilop, “Building a Security Community in Northeast Asia: Options and 
Challenges,” International Journal of Korean Unification Studies 18, no. 2 (2009), 146. 
37 Min Ye, “Security Institutions in Northeast Asia: Multilateral Responses to Structural Changes,” in 
Asia’s New Institutional Architecture. Evolving Structure for Managing Trade, Financial, and Security 
Relations, ed. Vinod K. Aggarwal and Min Gyo Koo (Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 2008), 122–23. 
38 G. John Ikkenberry, “A New Order in East Asia?” in East Asian Multilateralism. Prospects for 
Regional Stability, ed. Kent E. Calder and Francis Fukuyama (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 2008), 
226–26. 
39 See James R. Kurth, “The Pacific Basin Versus the Atlantic Alliance. Two Paradigms of 
International Relations,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 505 (1989), 34–
45; Aaron L. Friedberg, “Will Europe’s Past Be Asia’s Future?” The International Institute for Strategic 
Studies 42, no. 3 (2000), 147–59; David C. Kang, “Getting Asia Wrong. The Need for New Analytical 
Frameworks,” International Security 27, no. 4 (2003), 57–85; Cha, “Powerplay,” 158–96. 
 11 
than a deeper exploration of the origins of the outcomes according to the question this 
thesis raises. At this point, the article of Christopher M. Hemmer and Peter J. Katzenstein 
shall be mentioned. To a greater degree it explores the reasons behind different 
developments in the North Atlantic region and Asia, and the article finds some of these 
reasons in the issues investigated by this thesis. However, Hemmer and Katzenstein do 
not take into account the effect of reconciliation between Germany and its former 
wartime enemies.40 At the other end of the spectrum, Katja Weber and Jonathan Huang 
draw insightful conclusions for NEA reconciliation based on the European experience, 
but they do not address the issue of shared identity.41 So it seems promising to 
investigate the relevance of shared identity and reconciliation as a prerequisite for a 
future NATO-like security cooperative in NEA. 
E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
This thesis will evaluate the prospects for future security cooperation in NEA 
based on lessons from the North Atlantic experience, namely the presence of a shared 
identity and Germany’s efforts to reconcile with some of its former wartime enemies. 
This will be done in a two-case comparative study through an assessment of the 
status of shared identity in the North Atlantic region and Germany’s reconciliation efforts 
at a certain point in time, approximately between 1945 and 1955, and the comparison of 
this assessment with the development and current status of shared identity and 
reconciliation in NEA. 
The thesis will address the movements towards European integration that had 
been present as a rough idea since ancient times and increasingly gained seriousness 
since the Middle Ages. Our discussion will also examine speeches by politicians about 
European cooperation, such as Churchill’s 1946 speech in Zurich, in which he envisaged 
the United States of Europe and assigned France and Germany a lead role in the 
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necessary efforts towards the achievement of a European union, or the  January 1948 
speech by the British Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin who envisaged a spiritual union of 
the West. The NAT and memoirs of politicians who were present at the creation of 
NATO (including Secretary of State Dean Acheson) will be reviewed as will the 2001 
report of the East Asian Vision Group that argued for the creation of an East Asian 
community and the establishment of the East Asian Summit. Secondary literature, which 
will mainly be used, will be supplemented by primary sources. 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
The second chapter of this thesis will start with a look inside the long and fruitful 
history of movements for European unification and highlight the work of Count 
Coudenhove-Kalergi, who was the most prominent representative of the idea of European 
unification during the 1920s and 1930s. Subsequently, the motivations behind the 
creation of the North Atlantic region and NATO will be investigated, paying attention to 
the relevance of a shared identity in this context. 
This chapter will conclude with a look at reconciliation in Europe after the 
Second World War and then closely examine the status and achievements of 
reconciliation in NEA.  
The third chapter assesses the level and nature of integration throughout the East 
Asian region, whether this is political, economic, or cultural, and the existence of a 
shared identity will be scrutinized.  
The fourth chapter assesses the hypotheses developed above. This assessment 
utilizes the preceding analyses to estimate the extent and shape of future security 
cooperative in NEA, and contrasts these prospects with lessons from the North Atlantic 
experience. 
This chronological and topic-oriented composition seems reasonable since the 
thesis will assess the applicability of past experiences for future security arrangements in 
NEA. The thesis culminates in a brief conclusion summarizing all findings.   
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II. THE RELEVANCE OF SHARED IDENTITY FOR SECURITY 
COOPERATION IN EUROPE AND ASIA AFTER THE SECOND 
WORLD WAR  
A. THE IDEA OF EUROPE 
In the following sections, we will examine how the idea of a common and unified 
Europe developed, single out some of the idea’s proponents, and illustrate their 
approaches. Special regard will be paid to the effect Count Richard Nicolaus 
Coudenhove-Kalergi and his pan-European movement had on European unification in the 
years between the two world wars. This emphasis seems justified given the account of 
important political figures and national leaders who acknowledged Codenhove-Kalergi’s 
efforts. Among these were: Great Britain’s Prime Minister Winston Churchill, the British 
and Czechoslovakian foreign ministers Ernest Bevin42 and Eduard Benes, as well as 
Aristide Briand and Edouard Herriot, premiers of France. In addition, the first Prime 
Minister of the Federal Republic of Germany, Konrad Adenauer, and other proponents of 
European integration, like Georges Pompidou and Carlos Sforza, were among the 
members of the Pan-European Union.43 The purpose of this section is to show the 
abundance of ideas and concepts of European unity from which politicians could draw 
after the Second World War to claim the legitimacy of a shared European identity. The 
extension of this identity to the United States of America, based on shared norms and 
values, became at least the asserted moral basis of security cooperation between the 
Western European countries and the U.S. 
1. Thoughts on European Unity before the First World War 
The efforts to demonstrate a common European heritage go as far back as to the 
Roman Empire. Even if Coudenhove-Kalergi oversimplifies the effects of Roman rule by 
claiming that “from the boundaries of Scotland to Sicily, from Portugal to Romania, there 
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was one empire, one emperor, one administration, one army, one currency, one economic 
area, one culture, and, for the most part, one speech,”44 it was the civilizing and unifying 
effect the Roman Empire had throughout its European estates that was considered to be 
conducive for the development of the idea of a common Europe.45 After the ruin of the 
Roman Empire, which was followed by four centuries of the disintegration of Europe 
caused by the barbarian migration46, a new but short-lived unification of Europe was 
brought about by the bellicose conquests of Charlemagne. European unification, 
however, was not only forged through military capture but maybe even more so through 
the thoughts and ideas of intellectuals. One of the early intellectual pioneers of Europe 
was the French jurist and diplomat Pierre Dubois. As early as in 1306 he proposed a 
permanent assembly of European monarchs to ensure peace in Europe through the 
application of Christian principles.47  
In 1462, the King of Bohemia George of Podiebrad brought forward the 
suggestion for a continental confederation created by an international treaty. This treaty 
already foresaw a curtailment of national sovereignty, the principle of mutual non-
aggression, and a solidarity clause in the event of external attack. An institute for arbitral 
jurisdiction and provisions for joint military intervention and common defense were also 
part of George’s proposal. An assembly of delegates, which also would have a council 
and a president, was the highest organ of the confederation and was empowered to make 
decisions that were binding for all members of the confederation. In the end, Pope Paul 
II, who was not given a role in the confederation, undermined George’s plan so it never 
materialized.48 
In fact, the situation in Europe developed in a rather opposite direction from the 
one the king of Bohemia might have desired. Although the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 
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ended the hostilities between the parties of the conflict of the Thirty Years’ War, the 
peace accord ratified and institutionalized the division and fragmentation of Europe into 
national, sovereign entities. The intellectual struggle, however, to overcome the bellicose 
nature of relations between European states and mitigate the chaos that stemmed from 
this bellicosity continued. In 1625, Hugo Grotius envisaged a body where disputes 
between states would be mitigated by a third party outside the dispute.49 In 1638, 
Maximilien de Bethume, the Duc de Sully, laid out his ideas on cooperation between 
European states in his memoirs, portraying them as the grand design of Henry IV, King 
of France. Sully suggested a federation of states to defend Europe against threats posed 
by the Ottoman Empire. Cooperation between European monarchs to fend off an external 
threat was but only one side of the coin for Sully. The division among European states 
caused by the wars of religion had to be overcome to ensure peace. To achieve this end, 
Sully demanded the re-establishment of a Christian republic and the creation of a 
European army. This grand design aimed at European integration, laid out in great legal 
detail the future administrative structure of this Christian republic, and it necessitated the 
restructuring of the European political landscape that would lead to the creation of fifteen 
states of similar size and power to ensure a balance of power between European states. 
Several regional councils and one general council, which would serve as a court of 
appeal, had to be created and would conciliate disputes between the fifteen republics.50 In 
1693, William Penn penned an essay called Towards the Present and Future Peace of 
Europe, in which he called for a European diet where each member state was given a 
number of votes from ten to twelve based on a combination of economic factors and 
thereby reflecting the power a state had in relation to the rest of the diet members. Penn’s 
essay included the threat of force to any of the member states that did not follow the 
decisions of the diet or tried to wage war against another member state. It also 
highlighted the pacifying effect socialization between European rulers would generate. 
Finally, some of Penn’s ideas like qualified majority voting, rotating presidency, and a 
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secretariat have become features of the Council of the European Union.51 The more the 
enlightenment took hold, the more intellectuals shifted away from the rights of monarchs 
toward an institutional framework that meant the end of sovereign territorial states. 
Jeremy Bentham, for example, argued for a European assembly and army, and Jean-
Jacques Rousseau favored a European federation.52 
Just as the Thirty Years’ War was not a real setback to intellectuals’ occupation 
with a unified Europe, the French Revolution, even if it seemed to mock all lofty ideas of 
union and peace throughout Europe by its appeal to mass nationalism,53 was merely an 
interlude and did not stop the growth of ideas about a common Europe. The French 
sociologist and social reformer Claude Henri de Rouvroy, Count of Saint-Simon, incited 
many of the nineteenth century’s advocates of European union with his proposal for an 
institutional European unity.54 When in 1814 he published his study On the 
Reorganization of European Society or the Necessity and Means of Uniting the Peoples 
of Europe in a Single Body Politic, While Preserving for Each Their National 
Independence, Saint-Simon distanced himself from the overly academic approaches of 
some of his predecessors and laid out a very systematic and staggered approach to 
European unity. In Saint-Simon’s point of view, this unity had to be based on strong 
institutions that had the ability to overcome the European balance of power politics that 
was established by the Treaty of Westphalia. A federal institutional structure and a 
parliamentary monarchy as the governmental form entirely based on common values 
seemed the most adequate way to achieve this aim. The Great Parliament of Europe, 
which was constituted by a chamber of deputies and a chamber of peers and was 
empowered to deal with any issues, formed the legislative and stood vis-a-vis with the 
king and the government as the executive. Inter alia, the parliament was tasked with the 
development of codes of ethics and the supervision of public education throughout 
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Europe.55 In the end, the parliament should provide for that “in this way there shall be 
between European nations that which provides the link and the basis for all political 
associations: conformity of institutions, union of interest, concordance of concepts, a 
community of ethics and public education.”56 The work of Saint-Simon is even more 
significant since he explicitly addresses a European patriotism that exists in parallel to 
national patriotism. In order for a European government to work, its members had to be 
like-minded and consist of 
such a collective will which, in a national government, arises out of 
national patriotism, can only arise in European government from a broader 
generality of view, a more widespread emotion, which one may call 
European patriotism . . . this inclination which takes patriotism beyond the 
limits of the fatherland, this habit of considering the interest of Europe 
rather than the national interest, will be a necessary product of the 
establishment of the European parliament for those who are to be part of 
it.57 
Only a year after Saint-Simon published his study, the ideas and concepts of a 
shared European identity based on common norms and values seemed to have borne 
some fruits with the formation of the European concert of nations model. This 
community of European great powers emerged as a result of the post-Napoleonic 
settlement after the Congress of Vienna and brought about nearly a century of relative 
peace in Europe,58 shared values and norms with regard to civilization and legitimacy 
that in principle ensured the invulnerability of national sovereignty. While this did not 
prevent European powers from going to war with each other in the long-term,59 “the 
continental countries were knit together by a sense of shared values.”60 The institutional 
functions that the Concert of Europe had to ensure security, however, became subject to 
the divergence of interests and power shifts between the member states. Since the 
institutions were unable to adapt to these changes the established fragile security 
                                                 
55 General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union, Europe, 124–27. 
56 General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union, Europe, 123. 
57 Ibid., 121. 
58 Kaplan, NATO and the United States, 2. 
59 Hampton, “NATO, Germany, and the United States,” 241. 
60 Hampton, “NATO at the Creation,” 616. 
 18 
architecture decayed.61 An important move of the European concert, nevertheless, was 
the re-admittance of France into the circle of the great European powers in what was seen 
to be conducive to stability and peace in Europe, whereas after the end of the First World 
War, Woodrow Wilson warned against the humiliation of Germany as a source for future 
instability.62 At that time, he also strongly pushed the creation of the League of Nations 
that aimed at international conflict resolution through erosion of national sovereignty by 
adherence to binding laws and negotiation.63 The imposition of multilateral sanctions and 
interventions in the case of a violation of rules and principles by one of the League’s 
members were intended to guarantee collective security. In the end, the League of 
Nations proved itself to be a paper tiger, unable to prevent the Second World War.64  
2. The Pan-European Movement of Count Richard Nicolaus 
Coudenhove-Kalergi 
After the end of the First World War, various approaches emerged to overcome 
the crisis that Europe was enduring. These approaches, nevertheless, shared the same 
aim, namely to avoid another truculent war in Europe that would bring about the 
destruction of European civilization. While some people sought to reestablish Europe’s 
future by bringing back the alleged cultural unity of Europe’s Christian past, others 
believed that only the recognition of national sovereignty and Europe’s national diversity 
held the key to future peace. A third group of people tried to overcome national 
sovereignty and wanted to establish a European federation, and sometimes these three 
approaches were combined in a design of a future Europe.65  The pursuit of European 
union ultimately became manifest in the person of Count Richard Nicolaus Coudenhove-
Kalergi. He was of a cosmopolitan genealogy since the Coudenhove’s were aristocrats 
from Northern Brabant who moved to Austria, while the Kalergi’s were descendants of 
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the Byzantine imperial dynasty of the Phokas; the two families merged through marriage 
in the nineteenth century. In 1892, Richard’s father, Heinrich Coudenhove-Kalergi, was 
sent to the Austro-Hungarian embassy in Tokyo. There he fell in love with Mitsuko 
Aoyama, the daughter of a Japanese merchant and arts dealer, and against all social 
conventions Heinrich married her in 1893. Richard was born a year later in Tokyo but in 
1896 moved back to the ancestral seat of his family in Ronsperg (what is in today’s 
Czech Republic). In Ronsperg, he grew up in a cosmopolitan and multicultural 
environment that was affected by the many scholars, aristocrats, and diplomats who were 
guests of his father. Richard and his siblings did not perceive their parents as Austro-
Hungarian and Japanese, but rather as European and Asian; an attitude that Heinrich 
fostered since he wanted his children to be raised as Europeans, devoid of national bias. 
Overall, this environment of his childhood might have strongly influenced Richard’s 
sense of self as being a European.66  
After having realized the need for and possibility of European unity, Coudenhove-
Kalergi founded the Paneuropa movement in 1922.67 The overall aim of his movement 
was to establish a European political and economic unity based on a common European 
ideal that would supercede but not weaken national patriotism.68 He turned this 
movement into the Pan-European Union in 1923 with its headquarters in the imperial 
palace in Vienna. Subsequently, offices were established in various European capitals to 
promote Coudenhove-Kalergi’s ideas.69 The union’s program included “a European 
League of States, with mutual guarantees of the equality, security, and independence of 
all European states; . . . a European military alliance . . . ; the fostering of the national 
cultures of all European nations as the basis of a common European culture.”70 Even if 
fewer than the approximately 2000 people who attended the first Pan-European Congress 
in 1926 included a couple of active politicians, most European statesmen only sent 
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ambassadors or messages. Shortly after the first congress, the Pan-European Union 
offered the honorary presidency to Aristide Briand, the French foreign minister and 
future prime minister of France. Coudenhove-Kalergi hoped that Briand would take the 
pan-European movement from the level of a private aspiration to the realm of European 
governments,71 a hope that at least did not immediately come true since in 1928 
Coudenhove-Kalergi had to assert that “the Pan-European Union was but a private 
organization, and I was working as a powerless individual, neither backed nor assisted by 
any European government.”72  
He had to wait until 1929 before a major step towards bringing his ideas to the 
attention of European governments occurred. Briand discussed with British and German 
diplomats the feasibility of a European economic union as a first step towards a political 
union in March, followed by his announcement in July to propose the establishment of a 
European union at the next meeting of the League of Nations in Geneva on 4 
September.73 In his speech, Briand introduced his concept of the ‘United States of 
Europe’ to the assembly of the League of Nations, describing economic cooperation as 
the most pressing issue that had to be dealt with and that would be accompanied by some 
kind of a European federation, but which would not mean the loss of sovereignty of 
European states.74 Chief delegates of the European nations met for a luncheon after the 
assembly meeting and subsequently tasked Briand to draft a more detailed plan for his 
project that should be presented at the next assembly meeting in 1930.75 On 17 May 
1930, Briand presented his Memorandum on the Organization of a Regime of European 
Federal Union that now foresaw the subjugation of economic cooperation under the 
establishment of a political union and a European federation that respected the 
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independence and sovereignty of European nations.76 The reactions throughout Europe to 
the memorandum were mixed.77 While German and Italian newspapers regarded it as an 
expression of French imperialism and a way to exploit the rest of Europe,78 and the 
British, German, and Italian governments officially refused Briand’s proposal at a League 
of Nations meeting in September 1930, the other European governments paid lip-service 
towards his plan. They did not want to be the first to take further steps. The opposition 
cited Briand’s emphasis on political union before economic cooperation as a plan that 
would do more harm than good to the League of Nations.. A couple of days before 
Briand presented his memorandum, Coudenhove-Kalergi received a copy of it and 
privately expressed his disappointment but supported it officially. It was, after all, the 
only proposal for European unity on a governmental level and an important result of his 
work for the pan-European movement. The memorandum, however, marked the break 
between the two men since Coudenhove-Kalergi aimed at an idealistic European union 
while Briand tried to achieve less in the face of the national self-interests of European 
states. Coudenhove-Kalergi and Briand might have had the same aim, but their methods 
differed.79 Coudenhove-Kalergi criticized Briand’s memorandum because it did not try to 
break up national sovereignty and forge a true European federation but rather an 
ineffective copy of the League of Nations. He also accused all the European nations of 
not being able to overcome their own national interests.80 The failure of Briand’s 
initiative brought an end to the politics of European accommodation and marked the 
return to more confrontational relations especially between Germany and France.81 
As a tangible result of Briand’s memorandum, a Commission of Enquiry for the 
European Union was set up. This legal provision made the idea of European union indeed 
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legally binding,82 but the commission turned out to be without power and initiative.83 
Together with the generally indifferent attitude of its members, the commission ceased to 
exist in 1932 when its chairman, Aristide Briand, died.84 The changing political 
landscape also contributed its part to the demise of the pan-European movement in the 
1930s. The death of the Europe-friendly German Minister of Foreign Affairs Gustav 
Stresemann at the end of 1929 was a setback for the pan-European movement, and his 
successor Curtius did not seem to be able to contain the rising nationalism in Germany.85 
Briand saw his political downfall after his defeat in the election for the presidency of 
France, and in 1932 the German National Socialists won the elections in the German 
parliament.86 The interwar period saw the struggle between an increasing feeling that the 
political environment in Europe had to change in order to preserve European civilization 
and to avoid another devastating war and a soaring nationalism that mixed with 
socioeconomic interests.87 Even if the proponents of a unified Europe did not establish 
close ties to European governments, European economic and security cooperation 
seemed to have broader support throughout Europe. Such cooperation seemed to be an 
antidote to the harm that Europe had suffered from the First World War and to the 
problems that it was facing. In summary, “Europe as a cultural entity and possible sphere 
of state activity, alongside others, enjoyed considerable prominence in the 1920s.”88 The 
global economic crisis of the 1930s, however, ultimately tipped the balance in favor of 
nationalism,89 and at its end the decade saw the outbreak of the Second World War. 
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Coudenhove-Kalergi emigrated to the U.S. in 1940 and returned to Europe only 
after the end of the Second World War in 1946.90 By that time, Winston Churchill who in 
1930 mentioned, “The resuscitation of the pan-European idea is largely identified with 
Count Coudenhove-Kalergi. The form of his theme may be crude, but the impulse and the 
inspiration are true,”91 had been released from his duties as British prime minster. 
Churchill had started a new wave of European integration with his speech at the 
University of Zurich on 19 September 1946.92 In this speech, Churchill conjured a spirit 
of European unity and a common European heritage with emphatic passion. He 
demanded the re-creation of the European family in the structure he called the United 
States of Europe and instilled his audience with a sense of European patriotism and 
common citizenship. He also stated, “Much work . . . has been done upon this task by the 
exertions of the Pan-European Union which owes so much to Count Coudenhove-Kalergi 
and which commanded the services of the famous French patriot and statesman Aristide 
Briand.”93 Coudenhove-Kalergi sent a letter to Churchill, expressing his gratitude and 
highlighting the importance of Churchill’s speech for the future of Europe.94 
B. NATO – THE ORGANIZATIONAL EXPRESSION OF A SHARED 
WESTERN IDENTITY 
As pointed out in the introduction, there is some discussion among scholars about 
the motivations behind the actions of the various players who stood behind the creation of 
NATO and the rationale behind NATO’s right to exist. Similarly, the following 
discussion does not aim to make a definite judgment on what aspect of NATO’s raison 
d’etre was more important, its security community building aspects or NATO’s 
characterization as a security alliance that was primarily aimed against the threat posed 
by the Soviet Union. The aim of this discussion is notto prove that European and North 
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American countries came together after the Second World War only because they wanted 
to be part of an elitist and escapist group that basked in the memory of an alleged 
confraternity that surprisingly got tasked with a military mission. Nor does the discussion 
argue that NATO’s sole purpose was collective defense of its member states against the 
Soviet Union. Rather, our purpose is to show that even in times of serious threat the 
leaders of the NATO member states took NATO’s community building aspects seriously 
and paid attention to the inclusion of these aspects in NATO’s institutional form. By 
doing so, they made the North Atlantic security cooperation more than just a military 
alliance and braced it in the shared identity of the countries that joined NATO. This 
identity enabled characteristic features of NATO-like curtailment of national sovereignty 
as exemplified by the NATO command structure. Since NATO should be more than a 
military alliance and in parallel to its collective defense aspect tie together its members 
also in the political, economic, and social sphere, it needed a sense of shared identity 
among the alliance’s members to push beyond the boundaries of a military framework.  
A look at the genesis of NATO will be contrasted with the kind of security 
cooperation that arose in East Asia after the Second World War. Bilateral security 
arrangements between the U.S. and East Asian countries were characteristic of this 
security cooperation that stands in stark contrast to the multilateral and consensus-based 
North Atlantic example.  
The variety of explanations for the origins of NATO and the subtleness of 
differentiations between them, make a closer look at this issue seem worthwhile. Mary N. 
Hampton highlights the dual nature of NATO as a kind of security cooperation against 
the threat posed by the Soviet Union Based on lessons gained after the First World War 
and the failure of the League of Nations, though, NATO also aimed at avoiding a future 
war between the members of NATO through the creation of a transatlantic community 
that included a peaceful Germany. According to Hampton, this motive for the creation of 
a transatlantic security cooperation preceded the Soviet threat, and this threat was not the 
driving factor behind Western unity and German rehabilitation,95 even if it did push the 
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U.S. and Western European countries to assign NATO also a collective defense 
mission.96 The former U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright shared this view in a 
1997 statement, arguing that “NATO defines a community of interest among the free 
nations of North America and Europe that both preceded and outlasted the Cold War.”97 
While Lord Ismay mentions the report that was given to governments at the end 
of preliminary talks towards a NAT on 9 September 1949 that inter alia foresaw that the 
treaty should be more than military and was to “promote the stability and well-being of 
the North Atlantic peoples,”98 John English addresses economic and cultural pillars of 
NATO when he compares, for example, the economic relations of the U.S. and Canada 
with European countries and mentions the high number of Europeans who immigrated 
into North America after the Second World War. In citing the British historian John 
Baylis, English argues that a lasting security cooperation between countries combines 
economic and political relationships with military power and subsequently finds strong 
transatlantic relationships of that kind after the war. By looking at the novelties in foreign 
policy behavior of countries that acceded to NATO, he identifies diplomatic revolutions 
and decisive moments;99 denotations that would seem to be highly overdone if they 
described the creation of an old-fashioned security alliance that only was of a military 
nature. English stresses the fundamentality of a European linkage for the Canadians who 
held the belief “that a European identity was fundamental to Canadian national 
identity. . . . The American response was similar . . .100 Finally, English sums up the 
important factors that were at work at the creation of NATO: the denunciation of 
isolationism through a broadened focus of the U.S. away from the Americas to the 
Atlantic littorals; personal and cultural factors; the continued importance of Western 
Europe in the U.S. imagination; and, maybe most importantly, the construction of a 
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narrative in the U.S. and Canada that allowed for “a sense of fraternity that embodied a 
sense of common purposes and the willingness to die.”101 
In an intentionally simplified way, Morton Kaplan sums up various opinions 
about NATO when he describes it as a great monument of statesmanship, a means of 
American imperialism, or the major obstacle to an early and peaceful resolution of the 
Cold War102 but finally comes to the conclusion that NATO “provided the psychological 
lift necessary to sustain an environment for economic recovery . . . It also established a 
long-term American commitment to European unity and in part led to the pressure within 
the United States for German rearmament as one aspect of a reasonable defense posture 
for West Europe”103 and thereby strips NATO to some degree of its military purpose and 
makes it a means to various ends. Lawrence S. Kaplan also acknowledges that at least the 
effects NATO had were not only to provide security through military deterrence. Under 
the umbrella of NATO, the possibility of a future war between its members has become 
almost impossible to imagine, sovereign states connive curtailments of their sovereignty, 
and the politico-military as well as economic affairs between European countries that in 
the past were prone to conflict have fundamentally changed.104 He goes on to mention 
that the primary role of the alliance at its creation was to deter the Soviet Union from 
internal subversion of the member states and from external aggression towards their 
territories. In 1949, the alliance was not capable to defend Western Europe from an attack 
from the East. In addition, the military component of the alliance was, for example, for 
the Benelux countries not the most important one since they saw the alliance rather as the 
nucleus for a united Europe.105  
Finally, even if Sean Kay highlights collective defense against a Soviet threat as 
the first and primary function of NATO, he also acknowledges that “to strengthen and 
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expand an international community based on democratic principles, individual liberty, 
and the rule of law in the context of a peaceful international society”106  was one of 
NATO’s tasks. He mentions the high value the negotiators of the NAT placed on the 
principles their countries believed in. If the alliance they were about to construct should 
be able to endure the Cold War then this alliance must have a higher purpose than 
collective defense alone.107 The NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen 
reflected on this dual nature of NATO in a speech in the year 2010. He stated that the 
NAT “created a new partnership between North America and Western Europe, with a 
pledge of mutual defense at its core. Yet common fear was not the main motivating 
principle for this unique Alliance. The true inspiration was a common democratic ethos. 
From its very beginning, the Atlantic Alliance was not only about defending territory. It 
was also about preserving our democratic values.”108 
Since she concerns herself deeply with the identity related aspects of the North 
Atlantic security cooperation’s genesis, two articles of Mary N. Hampton can provide 
more detailed information about the security community building aspects of NATO’s 
origins. In her article “NATO at the Creation. U.S. Foreign Policy, West Germany and 
the Wilsonian Impulse,” Hampton claims that a number of ordering principles shared by 
U.S. elites in general and people in the State Department, in particular, which influenced 
these elites’ view of U.S. security interests, were rooted in a certain set of beliefs. These 
beliefs go back to former U.S. President Woodrow Wilson who refuted the European 
system of balance of power and instead aimed at a system of democracies that were 
interdependent, whose relations were institutionalized, and where shared values led to the 
development of common security interests.109 Such a transnational community would 
adhere to commonly accepted principles and rules and champion the concerted conduct 
of international relations and subsequently become a security community as defined by 
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Karl Deutsch.110 Such a “SECURITY-COMMUNITY is a group of people which has 
become ‘integrated.’ By INTERGRATION we mean the attainment, within a territory, of 
a ‘sense of community’ and of institutions and practices strong enough and widespread 
enough to assure, for a ‘long’ time, dependable expectations of ‘peaceful change’ among 
its population.”111 For this security community, shared values are essential for its birth 
and are more important than shared threats. Together with Wilson’s lament about the 
harsh treatment of Germany in the 1919 Treaty of Versailles that denied Germany a 
return into the European family of nations and did not open the door to create a strong 
democratic system in Germany, these beliefs influenced U.S. policymakers after the 
Second World War and led to the development of new ordering principles in the creation 
of the North Atlantic security cooperation. Firstly, the U.S. had to replace the balance of 
power system in Europe; secondly, a transatlantic community had to be built that 
included a democratic and peaceful Germany; and thirdly, this “community must be 
forged through interdependence and the acceptance of shared democratic values.”112  
Early on in the development of the transatlantic security cooperation the relative 
importance of community building became apparent. As Secretary of State Dean 
Acheson put it in 1949, “There developed on our Atlantic coast a community, which has 
spread across the continent, connected with Western Europe by common institutions and 
moral and ethic beliefs.”113 In the U.S. government, the forging of such a value-based 
community was often given precedence over more narrowly focused security interests. 
Accepting that the U.S. wanted to achieve the political goal of alliance cohesion and the 
construction of a Western community rather than simply the attainment of narrow 
military goals, political issues and national agendas of other alliance members often 
overlay such military considerations. Such an example is the issue of the multilateral 
nuclear force (MNF) of the 1960s.114 By itself a militarily useless initiative but pushed 
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by the German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer on the basis of Germany’s demand for an 
equal role within the alliance, the MNF foresaw a multilateral ownership of nuclear 
weapons, deep integration of forces and curtailments of national sovereignty. This 
undertaking compromised the U.S.-Soviet relations and called forth domestic and foreign 
resentments, but for the sake of maintaining the transatlantic community and assuring 
Germany of its equal status within the community, U.S. policymakers did not waver on 
the issue.115 This underlines the character of NATO as an institution that moderates 
Western security issues “through the application of norms, principles, rules, and 
procedures to which all members were beholden.”116 Hampton uses this finding to 
further substantiate her argument that the transatlantic security community pushed 
beyond the bounds of a traditional military alliance by refuting the traditional realistic 
approach to state behavior as being driven by exogenous interests like the pursuit of 
security. Realists cannot explain why nations would make decisions that conflict with 
their security interests and therefore realist approaches cannot satisfactorily explain the 
rationale behind NATO.117 In addition, Hampton shows that NATO was constructed as a 
durable framework when she mentions “the insistent feeling that NATO must be more 
than a military alliance . . . and . . . the very real anxiety that if NATO failed to meet this 
test, it would disappear with the immediate crisis which produced it.”118 
Talking about NATO’s future, the renowned realist John Mearsheimer forecast in 
1995 the end of NATO because “with the collapse of the Soviet Union . . . NATO must 
either disappear or reconstitute itself on the new distribution of power in Europe.”119 He 
was supported in his view by another famous realist, Kenneth N. Waltz, who in 1990 said 
that “NATO’s days are not numbered, but its years are.”120 Instead, NATO’s survival 
after the collapse of the Soviet Union and its subsequent incorporation of former member 
states of the Warsaw pact constituted a process wherein “NATO could build on its own 
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cooperative-security, community-building initiatives and practices from the Cold 
War.”121 These initiatives and practices were vested in article ten of the NAT that says 
“The Parties [of the NAT] may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European 
State in position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of 
the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty.”122 As NATO members had developed a 
‘we-feeling,’ they had become a security community already before the end of the Cold 
War.123 Thus, the security community building elements that where inherent to NATO 
from its inception–its long-term concept as a community based on common values in 
addition to its function as a collective defense mechanism–helps explain why, despite 
realists’ assumptions, NATO has not dissolved since the end of the Cold War. 
Hampton elaborates further on the existence of a shared security identity among 
the members of NATO in general and the U.S. and Germany in particular. The forging of 
a transatlantic community and fostering of a positive identification among its members 
would prevent member states from going to war again against each other and tie 
Germany to the West.124 In Hampton’s view, security identity goes to the heart of 
national identity, and therefore, the existence of such a shared security identity is 
significant. Once NATO member states have established a positive identification with 
each other, they regard their security as inextricably linked to the security of all the other 
member states. To create such a shared security identity through the writing of a sense for 
common history and destiny was one of NATO’s missions, and as a result of her research 
she identifies the existence of a shared security identity between the U.S. and 
Germany.125 
In the events that led up to the signing of the NAT, more evidence can be found 
for Hampton’s observation that NATO transcended the limits of a traditional military 
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alliance. In a speech he gave on 5 March 1946 in Fulton, Missouri, Winston Churchill 
once again invoked the common European heritage when he described the spread of 
Communism as a threat to Christian civilization.126 Against the backdrop of deteriorating 
relations with the Soviet Union, Churchill raised the idea of an alliance among like-
minded nations127 by arguing that “the safety of the world requires new unity in Europe, 
from which no nation should be permanently outcast.” He also addressed the need for a 
new structure of relations between European countries because “the old doctrine of a 
balance of power is unsound.”128 The Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs 
Louis Saint Laurent argued in a similar vein when he addressed the United Nations 
General Assembly in September 1947. He said that instead of having to rely on the 
Security Council to come to their protection, nations “may seek greater safety in an 
association of democratic and peace-loving states willing to accept more specific 
international obligations in return for a greater measure of international security.”129 
Since the Allied foreign ministers could not agree on a common plan for 
Germany’s future at their two meetings of March and November 1947, the wartime 
cooperation between the Western democratic Allies and the Soviet Union ended when the 
Soviet representatives abandoned the Allied Control Council shortly after the November 
meeting.130 This break-up of the wartime alliance motivated the foreign ministers of 
Great Britain and France, Ernest Bevin and George Bidaut, to look for U.S. support in the 
defense of Europe.131 The two men had good reason to hope for some kind of support. In 
a speech at the Pilgrim Society in London on 12 December 1947, the U.S. Secretary of 
State George C. Marshall emphasized “the great surge of American public opinion in 
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support of the effort to alleviate the sufferings”132 and the “natural growth in the case of 
two peoples enjoying a common heritage and having a common outlook on the 
fundamentals of human society.”133 At the occasion of a dinner that Bevin hosted on 15 
December,134 Bevin expressed to Marshall his vague ideas about “some western 
democratic system comprising the Americans, ourselves, France, Italy, etc., and of course 
the Dominions. This would not be a formal alliance but an understanding backed by 
power, money and resolute action. It would be a sort of spiritual federation of the 
West.”135 Bevin elaborated on this issue and gave a startling speech in the House of 
Commons on 22 January 1948. This speech is so rich with statements on common 
Western heritage and a future Western security cooperation that some passages of 
Bevin’s speech have to be mentioned. He stated, “The conception of the unity of Europe 
and the preservation of Europe as the heart of Western civilisation is accepted by most 
people. . . . No one disputes the idea of European unity.”136 Bevin highlighted “How 
much these countries have in common. . . . Parliamentary democracy, our striving for 
economic rights and our conception and love of liberty. . . . I believe the time is ripe for a 
consolidation of Western Europe. . . . We are thinking now of Western Europe as a 
unit.”137 His explanations culminate in the statement that the British government has 
“striven for the closer consolidation and economic development, and eventually for the 
spiritual unity, of Europe as a whole; . . . if we are to have an organism in the West it 
must be a spiritual union. . . . The union must primarily be a fusion derived from the basic 
freedoms and ethical principles for which we all stand. It must be on terms of equality 
and it must contain all the elements of freedom for which we all stand.”138 Bevin’s view 
on future security cooperation among the Western nations regarded “the old-fashioned 
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conception of the balance of power as an aim that should be discarded if possible.139 
Bevin’s speech led to the signing of the Brussels Pact on 17 March 1948 between Great 
Britain, France, and the Benelux countries. This treaty, negotiated for fifty years, codified 
the principles of self-help and mutual assistance in case of an attack of one party to the 
treaty by a third power140 as well as economic, social, and cultural cooperation.141  
Bevin succeeded in winning U.S. support for the defense of Europe, and on 6 July 
1948 the negotiations that finally led to the signing of the NAT officially started in 
Washington. These official negotiations, however, had a precursor in the form of secret 
negotiations between the U.S., Great Britain, and Canada based on proposals by Bevin on 
a future security cooperation between Western European countries, the U.S. and 
Canada.142 The Canadian representative Lester Pearson143 for sure had the words of 
Escort Reid, an important figure in the Canadian Ministry of Foreign affairs, in mind 
during the meetings. In a memorandum to the Canadian prime minister on the pact that 
was to be drafted, Reid wrote on 13 March that “the purpose of the pact is to rally the 
spiritual as well as the military and economic resources of Western Christendom against 
Soviet totalitarianism; [and] it must therefore not be merely a negative anti-Soviet 
military alliance.”144 The Canadians wanted the peacetime alliance to be long-lived and 
to deepen political and economic integration as well as to promote cultural cooperation 
between its members. If the raison d’etre of the alliance only was to counter the Soviet 
threat, Pearson argued, that “might mean that if the danger were removed, or appeared to 
be removed, this justification for a collective system would disappear.145 George Kennan, 
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a Soviet specialist in the U.S. State Department,146 supplemented this statement by 
emphasizing that “the community of interests of the participating governments was wider 
than military, it was traditional, historical, and would continue. . . . Association was 
necessary entirely aside from the troubles of the moment and might well go far beyond 
the military sphere.”147 
The question of which countries should be invited to join the North Atlantic 
security cooperation was fervently discussed during the secret negotiations and thereafter. 
Much is written about the fact that some of the founding members of NATO did not meet 
the criteria of either adhering to democratic principles, most notably Portugal with its 
authoritarian dictatorship under Antonio Salazar, or being a North Atlantic country, like 
Italy. Great efforts were undertaken by diplomats to convince their audience of the 
rightness of these countries’ inclusion in NATO.148  The sheer fact, however, that such 
efforts were invested in explanations as to why these countries should become members 
of NATO shows that the value based nature of NATO was taken seriously. Had NATO 
only been a military alliance against the Soviet threat, justifications for the membership 
of Portugal or Italy would not have been necessary in the first place. 
On 18 March 1949, U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson publicly announced the 
U.S. joining the transatlantic alliance and explained the rationale behind this 
groundbreaking step that ended roughly 150 years of American abstinence from 
peacetime alliances with foreign powers;149 an abstinence that was engraved in U.S. 
foreign policy by Washington’s farewell address in 1706, Jefferson’s inaugural address in 
1801, and the Monroe doctrine of 1823.150 In a radio address to the American people 
Acheson pointed out that  
                                                 
146 Kay, NATO and the Future of European Security, 21. 
147 Ibid., 24–25. 
148 For more information on the membership issue, see Wiebes and Zeeman, “Pentagon Negotiations 
March 1948,” 360–61; Kaplan, United States and NATO, 5; Robert J. McMahon, Dean Acheson and the 
Creation of an American World Order (Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, Inc., 2009), 74–75;  Kaplan, 
Long Entanglement, 30–34. 
149 McMahon, Dean Acheson, 82. 
150 Kaplan, NATO and the United States, 1. 
 35 
The very basis of western civilization, which we share with the other 
nations bordering the North Atlantic, and which all of us share with many 
other nations, is the ingrained spirit of restraint and tolerance. . . . These 
principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law have 
flourished in this Atlantic community. . . . For this second reason, as well 
as the first, North America and Western Europe have formed the two 
halves of what is in reality one community.151 
The U.S. President Harry Truman sent Acheson a telegram with regard to his 
radio address, and he “was most generous in praise of it and, he said, approved every 
word.”152 When the foreign ministers of the NATO member states met in Washington to 
sign the NAT, Acheson again pointed out that the North Atlantic community resembled a 
unity that derived from common values and was based on shared beliefs, spirit, and 
interests.153 This is reflected in the preamble of the NAT in which the NATO members 
declare their determination “to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization 
of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule 
of law.”154 
C. NO COMMON GROUND – THE EMERGENCE OF SECURITY 
ARRANGEMENTS IN EAST ASIA 
Even if one thinks that all the invocations of a common heritage of European 
nations that was shared with Americans and Canadians in the North Atlantic community  
were only window dressing to sell an ordinary military alliance to the North Atlantic 
peoples and politicians, one would nevertheless have to admit that the advocates of a 
shared identity had a pool of conceptions to draw from, as was shown in the chapter on 
the idea of Europe. In East Asia, instead, there was no such background of a positively 
embraced shared identity that would have been conducive to the creation of a security 
identity after the Second World War.  
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Until then, there had been two cases of an attempted imposition of a shared 
identity on the people of East Asia, namely the Sino-centric tributary system of the 17th 
and 18th centuries and the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere that was pursued by 
the Japanese at the beginning of the 20th century. At the basis of the tributary system was 
a presumption of Chinese superiority, while the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere 
manifested itself in an aggressive Japanese imperialism, expansionism and occupation of 
many of Japan’s Asian neighbors. Both concepts were coined by militarily or 
economically enforced cooperation.155 
So while there was no shared identity among the East Asians after the Second 
World War, American politicians did not consider a shared community of Americans and 
Asians to exist either but rather considered Asians to be of an inferior community.156 
Christopher Hemmer and Peter Katzenstein point out that debates among U.S. politicians 
did not contain the mention of shared values between the U.S. and East Asian potential 
allies after the Second World War. Rather they do stress the differences “in civilization, 
race, ethnicity, religion and historical memories that lead to the articulation of strong 
doubts about the current and future strength of these nations as part of an Asian 
alliance.”157 Looking for the rationale behind such statements, Hemmer and Katzenstein 
address the flaws of liberal and realist explanations for the emergence of bilateral security 
arrangements between the U.S. and some Asian states. While liberal institutionalists 
claim that nations are willing to join institutions when they expect benefits from 
cooperation, multilateral NATO-like security cooperation did not emerge in East Asia 
even though benefits were at hand. A realist approach that focuses on material 
capabilities and makes the exogenous interest of security the driving factor behind state 
behavior fails to explain why the U.S. pursued its interests multilaterally in Europe and 
bilaterally in Asia.158 Looking at the different threat perceptions in the European and 
Asian theater to explain the respective ways security cooperation was organized also fails 
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to explain these differences. If one accepts the notion that the multilateral NATO was 
founded in response to a Soviet threat that never turned into real aggression then it 
remains puzzling why the security cooperation in Asia remained bilateral after the 
Korean War that had turned the Communist threat into a real all-out war.159 Finally, 
Hemmer and Katzenstein argue that “identification is the mechanism that helps connect 
the construction of specific regional groupings in Europe and Asia to particular 
institutional features–multilateral or bilateral–of particular military alliances.” U.S. 
politicians could identify themselves with Europeans through religion, shared democratic 
values, or race; affinities that were almost completely absent in Asia.160 The ‘Eastern 
Establishment,’ men who were deeply rooted in a world marked by European power and 
had a strong European and Atlantic bias, dominated U.S. foreign policy after the Second 
World War and also held the institutional leverage to implement their Europe friendly 
policies.161 Ultimately, John Foster Dulles stated that “in the absence of identification, 
there could be no Asian equivalent of NATO.”162 
D. CONCLUSION 
By the time politicians on both sides of the Atlantic thought about the creation of 
a transatlantic security cooperation, numerous ideas and conceptions about a European 
union based on common heritage, traditions, shared norms and values had already been in 
existence for centuries. The substance of a European union inter alia included curtailment 
of national sovereignty, the promise of mutual assistance between members of the union 
in case of an attack by a third party, and the establishment of a common army. Even if 
these conceptions were mostly the concern of intellectuals and European governments 
repeatedly dismissed these conceptions because of their own national interests, there was 
a well-tilled field from which a plan could be drawn to build a security cooperation that 
was rooted in a shared identity.  
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The lessons of the European balance of power system that twice led to devastating 
wars told European politicians at the end of the Second World War that this system did 
not work and had to be replaced. A conception for a security community based on a 
shared identity was already laid out before the Soviet Union’s aggressive behavior 
became a threat to European democracies, even if this threat finally galvanized the North 
Atlantic security efforts. At its very beginning, however, “NATO was an institutional 
shell promoting reassurance for Western Europe. The U.S. security guarantee was mostly 
political in nature and had no organizational structure to facilitate the tasks of the 
alliance.”163  Neither did it have an organized military capability, integrated forces, or 
defense plans. It needed events like the successful test of Soviet nuclear weapons, the 
victory of Mao’s Communist forces in China, or the Korean War to push the military 
dimension of NATO.164  
While the Europeans could look back on a long history of notions of European 
unity that fostered a shared identity, this was not the case in East Asia. The Chinese 
tributary system as well as the Japanese Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere were 
imposed on people and did not create a positively embraced shared identity. The lack of 
such an East Asian identity combined with an absence of U.S. identification with East 
Asians prevented the emergence of NATO-like security cooperation in East Asia. 
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III. THE IMPACT OF RECONCILIATION ON INTERNATIONAL 
RELATIONS IN EUROPE AND ASIA AFTER THE SECOND 
WORLD WAR 
This chapter will compare the sources and consequences of reconciliation in 
Europe and NEA. In order to meet this end, we will examine the principles and 
mechanisms of reconciliation and their realization in the reconciliatory process between 
Germany, its former wartime enemies, and victims of the Nazi regime. A close 
examination of the Japanese efforts to reconcile with the PRC and the ROK will illustrate 
the level of reconciliation in NEA that has been achieved so far. 
A. A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK OF RECONCILIATION 
Interstate reconciliation is one of the most difficult and ambitious kinds of 
international cooperation since it is connected to some of the deepest human emotions.165 
As applied in this thesis, reconciliation is the process of peace building after a conflict 
between at least two parties.166 Reconciliation changes “conditions of international 
enmity into a status of bilateral amity, converting old enemies into friends.”167 This 
process is of a long-term nature and addresses the vivid commemoration of memories and 
an accounting of the past,168 and it can be pursued for pragmatic as well as altruistic 
reasons.169 Briefly looking at an example from NEA, reconciliation must not be treated 
lightly because “remembering and forgetting . . . give countries national identity, and 
channel the values and purposes that direct the future in the name of the past.”170  
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Following from this understanding, history, memory, and strategic alignment are 
linked. When in 1998 the President of the RoK, Kim Dae-Jung, met with the Japanese 
Prime Minister Obuchi, Obuchi apologized for Japanese wrongdoings towards the South 
Koreans in writing, and Kim accepted this apology sincerely. Kim expressed his desire 
for “a future-oriented relationship based on reconciliation as well as good-neighborly and 
friendly cooperation.171 In contrast, no written Japanese apology was offered during the 
visit of the PRC’s President Jiang Zemin in the same year. Even though the past and its 
accounting were identified as elements of a common Chinese-Japanese future, the 
Chinese insisted that Japan still had to learn from history. In the Chinese-Japanese case, 
history was confronted very openly.172 
The three issues of interplay of group emotions and politics, between domestic 
and international politics, and the institutionalization of memories have to be properly 
understood in order to gain an in-depth understanding of reconciliation.173 The need to 
protect its collective ego often hinders a group or nation from coming to terms with its 
own past. To continue with its future, a perpetrator (in the NEA case that is Japan as a 
nation) prefers his victims to forgive and forget his wrongdoing.174  Should the 
perpetrator be willing to apologize, the kind of apology still matters. At the negative end 
of the scale are defensive apologies because through these the perpetrator does not 
express any personal guilt. While with an excusing apology the perpetrator recognizes 
past wrongs, he still does not take moral responsibility but assigns the authorship of his 
wrongdoings to circumstances that were out of his control. Only genuine apologies 
determine the guilt and moral responsibility of a perpetrator and show his repentance.175  
There is, nevertheless, the possibility that the perpetrator will lapse into some kind 
of apology fatigue or even try to invoke a  sense of his own victimhood. The rationale 
behind such an approach is fourfold: firstly, it protects the group identity; secondly, a 
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positive and unifying national identity is forged; thirdly, the people get mobilized for 
post-conflict nation-building; and fourthly, it provides a justification to avoid 
responsibility. On the other hand, victims can stylize their victimhood for almost the 
same reasons; the fourth factor simply gets turned into a claim to righteousness and 
legitimacy, and a fifth factor is the boost to the victim’s damaged collective ego. This 
competition between national narratives often causes backlashes to apologies in the 
perpetrator’s country as well as to acts of forgiving in the victim’s country; both 
apologies and forgiveness are seen as unpatriotic acts. This vicious cycle can only be 
overcome through the combination of psychological and political means to overcome 
group emotions.176 Many of these findings are true in NEA as will be shown later on. 
Finally, collectively held memories of past conflicts that give shape to collectively 
held identities and in turn get shaped by these identities,177 become sticky and are 
difficult to adjust once they have become institutionalized. Examples of such an 
institutionalization are the Nanjing massacre museum in China or the visits of Japanese 
officials to the Yasukuni shrine Another way to institutionalize memories is through 
education. Since the youth shapes the future, education is a paramount battleground for 
reconciliation because of the view of the past it provides to the nation’s youth.178 The 
issue of Japanese textbooks and their distinct way of portraying Japan’s past will be 
mentioned later. 
B. GERMANY’S EFFORTS TO RECONCILE WITH ENEMIES AND 
VICTIMS OF THE NAZI REGIME AFTER THE SECOND WORLD WAR 
Looking at reconciliation in Europe after the Second World War it can be found 
that Germany made reconciliation efforts with its enemies and victims of the Nazi regime 
with the aim of political and moral readmission into the European family of nations on 
the basis of equality, the imperative of its foreign policy.179 The first chancellor of the 
Federal Republic of Germany, Konrad Adenauer, was convinced “that Germany was by 
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origin, conviction and necessity a West European country.”180 Adenauer made this 
conviction of Germany’s integration into the West his leitmotif and pursued it through 
cooperation in multilateral institutions that often brought about some curtailment of 
Germany’s sovereignty. Through reconciliation, Adenauer wanted to show the Western 
countries that Germany seriously was trying to come to terms with its past181 even if the 
German population did not always embrace his efforts and lagged behind Adenauer’s 
pursuit of reconciliation.182 According to Adenauer, “Germany could not become a 
respected and equal member of the family of nations until it had recognized and proven 
the will to make amends.”183 The 1952 Luxembourg Agreement settling the 
compensation for Israel figures as the official German ticket for readmission into this 
family.184  
Reconciliation, however, was the order of the day for Germany. The creation of a 
democratic Germany on basis of the Allies’ morality necessitated “a complete overhaul 
of German society, introducing democratic practices in politics, the economy, culture, 
education, press and radio, and the legal system.”185 A cornerstone of these Allied efforts 
was the denazification program through which Germans should be brought to mind their 
collective responsibility for the crimes of the Nazi era by removing former Nazis from 
leadership positions, holding war trials and punishing the guilty. The success of the 
denazification program is questionable because many high-ranking Nazis were never put 
on trial or even got back into influential positions in the Federal Republic of Germany.186 
One reason might have been the need for rehabilitation of the Germans as an impediment 
to enlist Germany in the containment of Communism.187 The demand for a German 
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contribution to the defense of the West geared U.S. policy to support German 
reconciliation.188 This necessitated the reconstruction of a “German identity vis-à-vis its 
former adversaries away from one of hostility and to one of friendship.”189  
If they wanted to achieve their short and long-term goals, Germans had to align 
their behavior with the Allies and actively pursue reconciliation through victim 
recognition and compensation.190  Reconciliation occurred in the way of governmental 
apologies, statements of regret, or bi- and multilateral agreements. In addition, the 
acknowledgement of grievances of the German population by some of Germany’s former 
enemies did not inveigle the German government to generally portray Germans only as 
victims of the Nazi regime or to make war crimes committed by any side during the 
Second World War a zero sum game.191 Instead, the Germans had come to realize that an 
occupation with their own victimhood would actually delay the realization of their 
goals.192  
In the course of Germany’s reconciliation efforts, territorial issues were settled 
with France, the Czech Republic, and Poland,193 and monetary compensation arose as a 
continuous element of German reconciliation policy. In 1952, Israel received payments 
that strongly burdened the German budget; in 1954, a law was passed that compensated 
victims of Nazi persecution; in 2001, a fund was established for forced laborers; and in 
2009, the Hardship Fund for living Nazi victims was substantially raised by 60 million 
Euros.194 Such actions highlight the conviction of Germany to reconcile with its former 
enemies and victims since they were conducted outside existing legal frameworks: at the 
time of the Holocaust, the state of Israel did not exist but was compensated in 1952 and 
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through the mechanism of special funds for individuals who were not covered by German 
domestic legislation.195 Beyond the role the German government played in reconciliation, 
non-governmental organizations like: bilateral textbook commissions with France, Israel, 
Poland, and the Czech Republic; Action Reconciliation/Peace; and German Historical 
institutes were engaged in reconciliation and through their actions facilitated official 
efforts.196 
Looking at the German efforts to reconcile with former enemies and victims of 
the Nazi regime and taking heed of former German President Richard von Weizsaecker 
who pointed out that “anyone who closes his eyes to the past is blind to the present,”197 
and said that “to accept the whole legacy of the past with all its good and with its 
burdening chapters, and to carry it together - … is what makes a nation,”198 one might 
say with persuasion that Germany has learned its lessons from history and has returned to 
the family of Western democratic nations. In addition, Germans have come to understand 
that even if they are not the perpetrators of the past199 they are “all affected by its 
consequences and liable for it”200 so that they feel a responsibility to prevent such crimes 
as were committed under the Nazi regime from happening again.201 
C. DEFICIENCIES IN RECONCILIATION BETWEEN JAPAN, THE ROK, 
AND THE PRC 
In the following, by looking at deficiencies in the above mentioned three areas of 
reconciliation, that is, the interplay of group emotions and politics (e.g., apologies and 
victimhood), between domestic and international politics (e.g., varying attitude of 
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Japanese politicians toward reconciliation, territorial disputes), and the 
institutionalization of memories (e.g., textbooks) in the relations between Japan, the RoK 
and the PRC, the maturity of their relations from a conciliatory point of view and the 
timeliness of a NATO-like security cooperation between them will be investigated.  
On 27 September 2006, one day after Shinzo Abe replaced Junichiro Koizumi as 
Japanese Prime Minister, the New York Times editorial stated the following:  
The [Yasukuni] shrine controversy, and the failure of Japanese textbooks 
to deal honestly with the wartime behavior of Japanese troops, complicate 
the nation’s ability to handle contemporary military issues, like the 
emerging debate over amending the pacifist constitution that America 
imposed on it after World War II. There is no reason Japan should not be 
able to make that change. But unless it first comes to terms with its history 
and its neighbors, such a step would be poorly received by other Asian 
nations.202  
The Japanese shortcomings in historical reckoning and a twisted view on history, 
combined with provocative statements by Japanese politicians and intellectuals, are the 
basis for repeated flare ups of conflicts between Japan and its neighbors, China and South 
Korea. In reaction to what the Japanese believed as being an attack by the West on their 
very existence and to avoid colonization by the West, they started to modernize their 
country and military in the late 1860s so that Japan was in a position to defend itself 
against any Western attempts at colonization. Yet, while Japan succeeded in economic 
and governmental modernization, it still felt besieged by Western countries in the 1930s. 
So Japan started to occupy many of its neighboring countries in reaction to the perceived 
threat by the West and to fend off Western influence.203 Japanese interpretations of the 
country’s colonial and imperial period even argue that this time had a positive 
modernizing effect on the occupied countries, and that the Pacific War was justified in 
the sense that the Japanese tried to liberate Asians from Western influence.204  
                                                 
202 James C. Hsiung, “Periscoping the Future: Will China and Japan Ever Be Like France and 
Germany?” in China and Japan at Odds: Deciphering the Perpetual Conflict, ed. James C. Hsiung (New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 193. 
203 Takashi Inoguchi, “Distant Neighbors? Japan and Asia,” Current History 94. no. 595 (1995), 395. 
204 Moon, “Truth and Reconciliation,” 545. 
 
 46 
When it comes to answering the question of who was the driving force behind the 
Japanese colonial efforts and the Pacific War, one narrative goes that a relentless 
militaristic caste drove the Japanese people into a devastating war and left them as 
victims. This point of view would allow for the Japanese population to distance 
themselves from the wrongdoings to their Asian neighbors.205 The U.S. occupation 
forces encouraged this attitude after 1945 by blaming the top Japanese military and 
political leaders of the 1930s for being solely responsible for the events that followed and 
took away all guilt feeling from the rest of the nation. At the Tokyo War Crimes Trial, 
also known as the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE), the Japanese 
people were not charged with the crimes of the Japanese Imperial Army, only some 
individuals were being accused. While several of the tried war criminals were set free and 
returned into political positions, the Japanese Emperor who some held responsible for 
Japan’s acts of aggression against its Asian neighbors was completely absent during the 
trials and was not charged with any responsibility. The U.S. deliberately chose to save the 
image of the Emperor in order to preserve the unity of the Japanese nation under the 
onset of the Cold War.206 While the Germans were required to distance themselves 
completely from the ideology and values of the Nazi regime, the Japanese were not asked 
to take such a step so that the Japanese society could go on to live up to some of their 
prewar values.207 Thereby, the occupation forces created the basis for Japan to become 
an unburdened democracy,208 and the three ‘Nos’ of no admission of aggression, no 
repentance and apology, and no compensation to victims became the policy of Japan’s 
dealing with history.209 
Moreover, China also applied this narrow standard until the 1990s to justify its 
relations with Japan “by delineating between a group of militarists and the rest of the 
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Japanese people they had exploited.”210 Nevertheless, Japan was seen as the aggressor 
and in order not to collide with the international community and be on a par with the 
West, the Japanese did not speak about their different point of view that the colonial 
period and the Pacific War were only an interlude in Japan’s continuous history of 
modernization and catch-up to the West.211  
Based on this interpretation of history, there are three versions of Japanese 
modern history prevalent across the Japanese society. The left-wing version highlights 
the guilt of Japan but at the same time stresses that the West was equally responsible for 
the developments that led to colonization and war. The center-right perspective, which is 
the most commonly accepted throughout the Japanese society, also puts Japan and the 
West on the same level of responsibility but tries to soften the overall tone of reproaches. 
Finally, the right-wing view sees the Pacific War as a Japanese act of self-defense against 
Western intrusion and as an attempt to liberate Asia from Western influence.212 This 
variety of Japanese interpretations of history, all based on the denial of a solely Japanese 
responsibility for colonial efforts and the outbreak of the Pacific War, overshadows 
Japan’s relations with China and South Korea and provokes reactions by these countries, 
where societies keep the memory of Japanese war crimes alive and share a definite view 
on Japan’s authorship of their sufferings.  
The different perceptions of history by the countries in the region repeatedly 
manifested themselves in conflicts between Japan on the one side, and China and South 
Korea on the other. Out of the range of issues, a closer look is taken at the visits of 
Japanese politicians to the Yasukuni shrine and the discussion over Japanese history 
textbooks. At the Yasukuni shrine, which is a religious foundation without ties to the 
government, the Japanese worship those who fell in wars for Japan; but since 1978 when 
the remains of 14 A-class war criminals of the Second World War were enshrined at 
Yasukuni, it has become a symbol for the Japanese handling of its past.213 For China and 
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South Korea, the visits that several Japanese prime ministers paid to the Yasukuni shrine 
in public and private capacities are “a vital issue as well as the most sensitive part of 
relations,”214 and statements like “those convicted have never been considered guilty of 
such crimes in the eyes of the Japanese people,”215 underlined the ambiguous attitude of 
Japanese officials towards Japan’s colonial and wartime history. In light of such Japanese 
behavior, the apologies of Japanese politicians like that of Prime Minister Murayama on 
15 August 1995, 50 years after the end of the Pacific War, seem to lose their meaning and 
sincerity. Murayama stated that Japan caused much damage and suffering especially to 
Asian nations, and he expressed his deep remorse about these events,216 but the Japanese 
diet followed Murayama’s statement only with a halfhearted, watered-down apology of 
Japan’s colonial and wartime deeds.217  
The controversy about Japanese history textbooks, which took place during the 
years 2001 to 2005, is another example for the not yet resolved issue of Japan coming to 
terms with its history and the different perceptions of Japan, China, and South Korea 
about modern history. In the view of China and South Korea, the textbooks that were 
developed by the right-wing Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform and 
approved to be issued by the Japanese Education Ministry on 5 April 2005, attempted to 
whitewash the Japanese aggression and atrocities during the colonial and wartime period, 
glorified the invasion of Asian countries as an act of promoting development, and 
renewed claims to the Takeshima islands (known as Dokdo in South Korea) that were 
under South Korean control since the end of the Pacific War.218 Although the Japanese 
government stated that these textbooks did not reflect its point of view on history and that 
there were no national history textbooks, it considered the textbooks as “thoroughly 
examined upon necessary criteria, including the provision concerning neighboring 
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countries.”219 Finally, the year 2005, which marked the 40th anniversary of the Japan-
South Korea normalization treaty and which was intended to become a year of friendship 
between the two countries, turned out to mark a low point in their relations. On 17 
March, South Korea’s President called publicly for Japan to apologize and displayed the 
Japanese claims to the Dokdo islands as “a second dispossession of the Korean peninsula 
that denies the history of Korean liberation.”220 Roh foresaw a diplomatic war that could 
freeze the relations between the two countries and even slow down the economy. 
Furthermore, South Korea would try to convince member states of the United Nations 
(UN) to vote against Japan’s bid for a permanent seat in the UN Security Council.221 
While in 2003 Japan’s Prime Minister Koizumi stated that Roh was the person “we can 
build a cooperative relationship together toward the future,”222 the events in 2005 show a 
fundamental change in the South Korean relations with Japan. In China in April 2005 
“such large cities as Shanghai and Beijing became scenes of violent anti-Japanese 
demonstrations,”223 and Koizumi was regarded as having “ruined the promising 
prospects of Japanese diplomacy.”224 
More than 50 years after the end of Japanese occupation of the Korean peninsula 
and the end of the Pacific War, Japan-South Korea relations are still burdened by 
historical issues and territorial disputes. While South Korean scholars argue that the 
history of Japan and South Korea is interrelated and cannot be viewed apart from each 
other,225 Japanese nationalists regard the discussion over history as a domestic issue that 
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is not open to the views and interpretations of foreign nations.226 Briefly after the end of 
the war, Japanese politicians gave the South Koreans plenty of reasons that left the 
impression of an unrepentant and historically ambiguous Japan. Noteworthy is the 
statement of the head of the Japanese officials that were engaged in the normalization 
talks with South Korea, Kanichiro Kubota. He publicly stated in 1953, “Japanese rule 
over Korea was not entirely without positive benefits.”227 The normalization talks 
continued, however, and the two nations signed the bilateral Normalization Treaty in 
1965; but their relations are still strained by historical issues and territorial disputes. 
Various explanations for these circumstances can be found, one of which highlights the 
legacy of the Japanese occupation of the peninsula between 1905 and 1910; another 
stresses the uneasiness of the Japanese with the authoritarian regime in Seoul (at least 
until 1993); and the third addresses the role of the United States as Japan’s and South 
Korea’s patron by restricting their free hand and national interests.228 No matter what the 
reason was (or still is) the most influential one, the distance to Japan created a 
specifically anti-Japanese nationalism in South Korea229 and a national identity that 
obtains much of its essence from being in opposition to Japan.230 
The round dance of rapprochement and backlash continued through the 1980s and 
1990s. In 1983, the Japanese Prime Minister Nakasone paid his first foreign visit to South 
Korea and wanted to initiate a climate of friendship and reconciliation. Nakasone’s 
Minister of Education, Masayuki Fujio, spoiled this effort by publishing an article that 
asserted the Koreans themselves were to some degree responsible for the Japanese 
annexation of their country in 1910. In a similar manner, the remorse of Prime Minister 
Murayama in 1995 did not receive comparably strong support from the Japanese diet. In 
the end, the Japanese apologies were seen by the South Koreans as expressions by 
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individuals and that they could not be considered as statements of remorse of the 
Japanese nation.231 From the perspective of the South Koreans, there was still a lack of 
genuine regret for the past wrongdoings within the Japanese society.232  
There were, however, also self-critical voices to be heard in South Korea. The day 
after the Japanese education ministry approved the contested history textbooks, the South 
Korean major daily newspaper KyungHyang Shinmun urged for a distinction between the 
Japanese government and people and extreme rightists in Japan. South Korea should 
increase its efforts to make the Japanese think about history so that they would truly 
come to terms with their past.233 Such an approach “will ultimately be more effective 
than writing hate messages in blood, burning the Japanese flag, and one-time events that 
serve as an outlet”234 for the rage of the South Korean people. Any nationalistic outrage 
against the Japanese would only deprive the South Koreans of the honesty of their 
criticism.235 In addition, South Korean scholar Park Yuha mentioned that as long as the 
South Koreans distrust the Japanese they would not accept any apology.236 
The beginning of the 21st century was marked by a glimpse of hope for an 
improvement of the Japan-South Korea relations following the remarkable summit 
between South Korea’s President Kim Dae Jung and Japan’s Prime Minister Obuchi. The 
two politicians issued an ambitious joint declaration that called “upon both countries to 
overcome their unfortunate history and to build a future-oriented relationship based on 
reconciliation.”237  Kim Dae Jung and Obuchi called their people “to participate in joint 
efforts to build and develop a new Japan-Republic of Korea partnership.”238 
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In 2001, when Junichiro Koizumi came into office as Prime Minister of Japan, he 
could start his rapprochement towards South Korea from a properly tilled soil, and the 
results of a 2003 summit between him and the newly elected Minister of South Korea, 
Roh Moo Hyun, were well received in Japan. During his visit to Japan, Roh stated that 
history should no longer burden the relationship between the two countries, and he did 
not ask for an apology. He did not comment on Japan’s military buildup or on Koizumi’s 
visits to the Yasukuni shrine. But, while the Japanese booked the summit as a success, 
Roh raised much criticism in South Korea.239 This domestic backlash to Roh’s 
rapprochement to Japan exemplifies one of the findings about reconciliation namely that 
forgiveness might be perceived as an unpatriotic act in the victims’ country.  
In addition, no matter how promising the 2003 summit might have been, the 
history textbook debate had already cast a cloud over the relations between the two 
countries since 2001. After the first disgruntlements about the history textbooks, a joint 
history committee was established in 2001 that should investigate common historical 
issues. The committee produced a considerable amount of documents, but finally broke 
up in June 2005 conceding that the involved historians could not find a consensus on 
issues of the past.240 Again, this failure ties in to findings on the conceptual framework of 
reconciliation. The institutionalization of different national narratives in the area of 
education through the introduction of contested textbooks poses an impediment to 
reconciliation. 
While the Koizumi period between 2001 and 2006 can surely be seen as a setback 
in the Japan-South Korea relations, these seem to be improving again since Taro Aso 
became Japanese Prime Minster in 2008. The issue of different perceptions of the past is 
an exception to the generally good state of bilateral relations, and this discord has 
repeatedly led to diplomatic crises.241 
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To sum up, the relations between Japan and South Korea seem to depend on the 
intentions and good will of individual politicians on both sides. Their ability to guide and 
master public opinion, to curtail the influence of nationalistic elements in their countries, 
as well as to bring about a relationship based on mutual trust between the two countries’ 
people will be crucial in building an enduring partnership. Here, the example of close 
personal ties between Konrad Adenauer, Robert Schuman, and Charles deGaulle 
highlights the importance of  like-minded leaders in taking reconciliation forward 
meaningfully and sustainably, while dampening resistance in the own country.242 
In comparison to South Korea, the normalization of diplomatic relations between 
Japan and the PRC started with the declaration of a joint communiqué in 1972 (during the 
period of U.S. and UN transition of Chinese recognition from Taipei to Beijing). In that 
document, Japan and China stated their “desire to put an end to the abnormal state of 
affairs that has hitherto existed between the two countries.”243 As mentioned further, 
“The Japanese side is keenly conscious of the responsibility of the serious damage that 
Japan caused in the past to the Chinese people through war, and deeply reproaches 
itself.”244 The communiqué also included China’s denunciation of any war reparations 
from Japan.245 The declaration of this communiqué led the Japanese to the conclusion 
that law now solved the history issue with China. Nevertheless, the Chinese people still 
felt emotional about the war but were at this time not allowed to speak their feelings. 
It took until the late 1990s, when in the course of the PRC’s ongoing opening to 
the world and its incremental granting of freedom of speech to the Chinese people, there 
emerged popular discontent with the Japanese treatment of history.246 At the same time, 
nationalism rose in Japan and China that found its expression in a new wave of neo-
nationalism by politicians in Japan and as ultra-nationalism being expressed through 
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emotions by the masses in China.247 In Japan, the trend towards neo-nationalism went 
back to the 1980s when first claims about the end of the postwar era and a new Japanese 
global role and responsibility arose. The desire to reexamine the past added to this trend 
from the mid-1990s on.248 In China, the rise of nationalism was spurred by the realization 
that the country had become a power of global importance and the corresponding 
impression that formerly China was not self-confident enough to speak up against other 
powerful nations.249 
In reaction to the Chinese ultra-nationalistic view and in an attempt to return the 
discussion about Japan to a formal level, Chinese scholars explored a new view on Japan 
that should go beyond the double standard of the government. He Fang initiated this trend 
in 1997 by arguing that the Japanese society was tired of apologizing over and over again 
for wrongdoings from more than 60 years ago, and that Japan would like to play a role in 
international politics in accordance with their economic weight. In 2001, Feng Zhaokui 
added that it was up to the Japanese to decide the issue of history.250 Ma Licheng and Shi 
Yinhong who basically argued that the Japanese had apologized sufficiently and that the 
issue of the war history should be taken off the Chinese diplomatic agenda took this 
perception to extremes in 2002–2003. Any further insistence on apologies or tabling of 
the history would only incite national sentiments in Japan, be counter-productive for 
enhanced China-Japan relations and unnecessarily burden them. Such strong statements 
challenged the more conservative Chinese thinkers who argued that the Chinese people’s 
memory of Japanese wartime wrongdoings could not just be deleted on order from the 
government, and the government would not be in a position to prohibit the Chinese to 
question the deeds of Japan during that period.251 
The downturn in Japan-China relations, brought about by the ambiguous behavior 
of Koizumi as Prime Minister of Japan, caused a decline of the new school of thought.252 
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It seemed that the scholars who thought of the Japan-China relationship in a more 
traditional way had a better connection to and support from the public, but the new 
thinkers seem to be afloat again since Shinzo Abe was elected Japanese prime minister in 
2006.253 After Abe paid his first overseas trip to China, he stated his aim to “build a 
strategic relationship of mutual benefit in which we together work to solve global 
challenges”254 and when asked about the history issue he assured, “Chinese leaders 
referred to the spirit of using history as a mirror to progress toward the future.”255 
China’s Premier, Wen Jiabao, spoke in a similar fashion when he visited Japan in 2007 
and gave a speech at the Japanese Diet. He declared, “By stressing the importance of 
drawing lessons from history, we do not mean to perpetuate hatred. Rather, we want to 
secure a better future for our relations.”256 Finally, Abe was given credit for his efforts to 
deepen the Japan-China relationship and the ties to Japan’s Asian neighbors.257 
The discourse between Chinese new thinkers and scholars of a more traditional 
approach to Japan reveals the division in China about how to deal with the common 
colonial and wartime history. The understanding of China’s limited means to make Japan 
genuinely come to terms with its past is in contrast to the demand for apologies and 
keeping the memory of Japanese wrongdoings alive. The latter approach can be seen as a 
tool in the competition for power in the Japan-China relationship by forcing Japan to 
apologize to China and thereby displaying China as being more powerful. On the other 
hand, the approach of the new thinkers acts on the assumption of equality between Japan 
and China and underlines the right of each nation to pursue its national interest. As long 
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as the question of distribution of power between the two countries is not decided, the ups 
and downs in relations between Japan and China will most probably go on.  
Since the memory of Japan’s colonial and wartime wrongdoings against its 
neighbors in China and South Korea is still very much alive in these two countries, 
Japan’s shortcomings in historical reckoning impact negatively on its relations to China 
and South Korea, and also present an obstacle to its efforts to take a more active role in 
international politics by using military power. On the other hand, there seems to be a lack 
of willingness in South Korea to scrutinize its own perception of history, to accept the 
repeated apologies made by Japanese politicians, and to genuinely forgive the Japanese 
for their wrongdoings of the past. In China, the discussion about Japan’s historical 
shortcomings and efforts to become a normal nation seems to be more influenced by the 
overall competition for power between the two countries. It looks as though the different 
perceptions of history are taken hostage to achieve political gains and are, therefore, kept 
alive rather than these perceptions being the root causes for irreconcilable frictions 
between the involved countries. In other words, as long as it serves some people’s 
interests to make use of history, then the work of settling the historical issues themselves 
can hardly even begin.  
After all the ups and downs of the past, relations between Japan, the RoK, and the 
PRC, seem to be overshadowed again. At his first press conference as newly elected 
Japanese Prime Minister, Shinzo Abe stressed the Japanese preference for bilateral ties 
with the U.S. rather than with Asian neighbors by saying “that the first step in turning 
Japan’s foreign and security policy around is reinforcing our kizuna–or bonds of 
friendship–once more under the Japan-U.S. alliance, which is the cornerstone of Japanese 
diplomacy.”258 When at the same occasion Abe said “right now, at this very moment, the 
Japan Coast Guard and members of the Self-Defense Forces are defending Japan’s seas 
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and skies off the coast of the Senkaku Islands,”259 he again unleashed the precarious 
relations with the PRC. 
D. CONCLUSION 
In contrast to the reconciliation efforts of Germany after the Second World War 
that were acknowledged and accepted by its former enemies and the victims of the Nazi 
regime, Thomas Huebinette asserts that  
In Northeast Asia, however, neither the consequences of the Second 
World War and the subsequent Cold War nor the legacies of the Japanese 
colonial empire have been sufficiently reconciled and rectified, and . . . 
reconciliation has not been achieved in Northeast Asia in the same manner 
an in Europe.260 
This might have been because the period that is most conducive and important to 
reconciliation, i.e., the phase immediately after a conflict, was marked by severe tensions 
in the international environment and now has passed. This phase was overshadowed by 
the onset of the Cold War.261  Unlike in Europe, where several powers were capable of 
supporting U.S. containment of Soviet ambitions, in Northeast Asia the United States 
opted for a quick reconstruction of Japan because it saw Japan as the only country in the 
region that held the prospect to become a great power again and support the U.S. in the 
containment of Communism.262 The perceived urgency of a Japanese contribution to the 
defense against Communism and the subsequent establishment of bilateral U.S.-Japanese 
security ties were given preference before a multilateral security framework that would 
have included several countries in the region. The failure of the effort to form a Pacific 
Ocean pact–a multilateral security arrangement that would have placed a rearmed Japan 
on the same level with countries like Australia, New Zealand or the Philippines–was due 
to these countries’ unwillingness to enter into an agreement with the former aggressor as 
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much as Japan’s unwillingness to join the pact. Once this had become obvious, the U.S. 
pursued bilateral security arrangements with other countries in the region.263 Taking this 
path “led to Japan’s recovery but also to its isolation from the rest of Asia, and an 
absence of reconciliation with the region.”264 
The domestic setting of conflict-affected countries also impacted the prospects of 
reconciliation. The need for external acceptance and economic support after the end of 
the Chinese civil war drove the PRC and the Republic of China to paint the picture of 
Japan in brighter colors than might have been expected. Both countries attempted to 
downplay the crimes committed by Japanese forces during the Pacific and did not push 
for compensation for Chinese losses suffered during the war, in order to gain Japan’s 
recognition and support. This in the end contributed to a low perception of a need for 
reconciliation in Japan.265   
The current level of reconciliation between Japan, the RoK, and the PRC can be 
described as shallow reconciliation with few common narratives, a partial coming to 
terms with the past, limited contrition, and limited forgiveness. Deep reconciliation as 
distinguished from shallow reconciliation is characterized by the impossibility of future 
conflict between the reconciling parties.266 Given the current territorial disputes, the 
option of conflict in NEA does not seem to be completely eradicated.  
For Germany, reconciliation was a prerequisite for its return into the family of 
European nations. As discussed above, Adenauer’s central belief in an affiliation to a 
family of nations stemmed from a conception of European integration earlier and deeper 
than the emergence of these states as modern Western democracies. This context stands 
in fundamental contrast to the Northeast Asian situation after the Second World War. 
Neither Chinese civilizational superiority nor the Japanese Greater Asian Co-Prosperity 
Sphere instilled a positively embraced sense of belonging to a supranational family, and 
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Japan even isolated itself from its Asian neighbors and turned its back on them.267 This 
might have prevented the Japanese from realizing and acknowledging the need to 
reconcile with their wartime enemies and victims, and pursue re-admittance into their 
circle in the first place. For the Japanese, there was no such thing as an East Asian family 
of nations. 
Reconciliation also was the prerequisite for Germany’s admission to NATO 
because “unless two former foes can reimagine a new and benign image for each other, 
no robust common identity . . . is possible.”268 As Mary N. Hampton puts it, the partner 
in a security community with whom a common security identity is to be shared has to be 
seen “as a cognitive extension of the self.”269 The absence of such a security community 
in Northeast Asia is palpable. 
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IV. AN EAST ASIAN COMMUNITY AND ITS IMPACT ON A 
SHARED IDENTITY IN THE REGION 
Based on the assumption that– like reconciliation–a shared identity between the 
members of a security community is a normative prerequisite for the establishment of a 
security community, this chapter examines the success of the efforts that have been made 
so far to foster a sense of shared identity in East Asia. These efforts took off after the East 
Asian financial crisis that necessitated the need for closer cooperation between countries 
whose economies had become more interdependent. The evolution of a shared identity 
will be observed through the progress made in establishing an East Asian community 
(EAC) and a comparison between the claims made of creating a shared identity in various 
documents starting with the first report of the East Asia Vision Group I (EAVG I) in 
2001 and the level of shared identity in East Asia as identified in the latest stocktaking 
report of the East Asia Vision Group II (EAVG II) in 2012. 
Starting in the 1980s, the increase in economic interconnectedness pushed the 
process of integration in East Asia. Cross-border investments between countries like 
Japan, South Korea, the Philippines or Singapore brought East Asia closer together and 
led to a growth of intraregional trade from 33.9% in exports and 34.8% in imports in1980 
to 50.5% in exports and 59.7% in imports by 2003.270 As a first response to this 
development the Prime Minister of Malaysia, Mahatir Mohamed, proposed the creation 
of an East Asian Economic Group (EAEG). His proposal was subsequently dropped 
because the U.S. feared its exclusion from this regional economic body as well as it saw 
it as a competitor to the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) that was founded 
only in 1989. In addition, the U.S. opposition to the EAEG also made some ASEAN 
countries withhold support for the group.271 
By the end of the decade, however, the dramatic effects of the 1997 Asian 
financial crisis revealed and brought to everyone’ s attention the need for closer 
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cooperation between East Asian countries and demonstrated “that the political 
development in the region lagged clearly behind the trend of economic 
globalization.”272As a result, cooperation between ASEAN and Japan, the RoK, and the 
PRC, was pushed and subsequently led to the first ASEAN Plus Three (APT) summit in 
1997. At the next summit in 1998, South Korean President Kim Dae-Jung who was 
looking for ways to bring the countries of Northeast and Southeast Asia together in one 
body proposed the establishment of an EAVG that finally came into being in 1999. The 
EAVG “was tasked with identifying ways by which the expansion of ASEAN to involve 
the three major states of Northeast Asia could be taken forward.”273 To sum up, the 
integration of East Asia was necessitated in the first place by market forces rather than 
having been pushed by precise political will. In this sense, East Asian integration differs 
from European integration, which was taken forward by the conviction of politicians for 
whom economic measures were a means of integration and who were willing to cede 
certain amounts of national sovereignty for the goal of integration.274 
The construction of an EAC is based on the APT process275 and gained further 
substance with the Joint Statement on East Asian Cooperation of the 1999 APT summit 
through the provision of a framework and mechanism for this cooperation.276 In this 
statement, APT leaders agreed to intensify dialogue and collective efforts to improve the 
living together of East Asians. They identified measures for future cooperation in the 
economic, social, and political areas, recognized the ongoing work of the EAVG, and 
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“expressed greater resolve and confidence in further deepening and broadening East Asia 
cooperation towards generating concrete results with tangible impact on the quality of life 
of the people of East Asia and stability in the region in the 21st century.”277  
The 2001 report of the EAVG subsequently laid out “a vision that would inspire 
East Asian peoples and governments towards building an ‘East Asian community’ that 
will address the region’s future challenges and advance mutual understanding and 
trust.”278 One of the goals of the EAVG report is to foster an East Asian identity, one of 
its key recommendations of social and cultural cooperation is to promote regional identity 
and consciousness,279 and some of the EAC’s guiding principles are the development of a 
shared identity through the promotion of trust, confidence, and common interests as well 
as the creation of a regional thinking that respects the principle of national 
sovereignty.280 This caveat with respect to national sovereignty that leaves the door open 
for the pursuit of national interests then begs the question of how deep this shared, 
regional identity that aims at promoting the welfare of all East Asians can really run. 
The EAVG report lays out fifty-seven concrete measures in the functional areas of 
economic, financial, political and security, environmental and energy, social, cultural and 
educational cooperation. In accordance with report’s assumption that “cooperation in the 
economic field . . . [will] serve as the catalyst in the comprehensive community-building 
process,”281 the majority of these measures can be found in the areas of economic and 
financial cooperation. 
While the report addresses the need to solve security challenges like territorial and 
maritime disputes as well as resource conflicts and proposes confidence building, 
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consultations and dialogue as the main vehicles to achieve this aim,282 recommendations 
for cultural and educational programs generally foresee the appreciation of East Asian 
history.283 The report, however, does not propose ways to achieve a common or at least 
shared view on East Asian history and does nothing to address the issue of competing 
historical narratives in the region, especially in NEA. Therefore, it is no wonder that 
ambitious projects like the 2005 Japanese-RoK history textbook fail because the 
protagonists hold opposing historical views. Finally, even though the report claims that 
the direction for the building of an EAC is clear,284 it did not detail a final shape of the 
EAC,285 no benchmarks or definite goals were established that had to be achieved in a 
certain timeframe. The realization of the EAC’s lofty ideals was left to the willingness of 
the APT countries. 
In 2002, the report of the East Asian Study Group (EASG), which was written by 
government officials, narrowed the fifty-seven measures of the EAVG report, which was 
written by intellectuals of APT countries, down to twenty-six measures of high priority 
that seemed to be implementable and likely to produce some concrete contribution to the 
achievement of the vision of an EAC laid out in the EAVG report. Even though the report 
argues a balanced selection of measures from the various functional cooperation areas, 
eight out of the seventeen short-term recommendations and five out of the nine medium 
to long-term measures are of economic and financial nature.286 Like the EAVG, the 
EASG dedicates actions to the creation of an East Asian identity by proposing to “work 
together with cultural and educational institutions to promote a strong sense of identity 
and an East Asian consciousness.”287 Since the existence of an East Asian identity helps 
to reach the goal of East Asian integration, the report claims that it is every government’s 
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responsibility to foster this sense of identity and an East Asian consciousness because 
people will realize that they share a common faith and they will change their way of 
thinking. Again, these efforts are to be supported by research, education, and publicity.288 
The report ends with the claim that through its successful implementation “the identity of 
East Asia will also be greatly fostered. Advanced mutual understanding and trust, 
together with strengthened regional identity, will promise a bright future for East 
Asia.”289 The realization of this bright future is left to the member states; further studies 
and discussion are deemed to be necessary and action plans should be drawn up.290 Like 
the EAVG report, the EASG does not develop a concrete and binding timeline for 
implementation, nor does it define an endstate that has to be achieved in order to 
determine the existence of an EAC. The attempt to make the EAVG vision more feasible 
indulges itself in making more detailed proposals whose implementation is not demanded 
and is not a real step forward towards the realization of the EAC.  
After this ambitious start, the EAC project seems to have fallen into a deep sleep. 
Leaders of the APT countries mentioned the EAC at various occasions and underscored 
its importance as a long-term goal to be achieved to contribute to peace, security, 
prosperity, and progress in the region.291 In addition, the 2007 Second Joint Statement on 
East Asia Cooperation stated the member countries; willingness to enhance “cultural 
cooperation, education collaboration, deepening mutual understanding an forging a sense 
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of East Asian identity and consciousness.”292 An APT Cooperation Work Plan that also 
foresaw the cultivation of an East Asian identity supplemented the joint statement.293 At 
the bottom line, the repeated use of the same language that can be found in various 
documents throughout a couple of years leaves the impression that not much progress had 
been achieved in the building of an EAC. Also, the rather thin proposals of the second 
joint statement and the work plan do not offer much ground to take the EAC forward, and 
an emphasis on economic cooperation is always visible. 
At that time, the EAC process was in a stalemate. Being asked at a press 
conference why the declaration of the first EAS did not provide any further guidance on 
the building of an EAC, Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi stated that from his point of 
view “ASEAN’s integration will come first, and then after that, a more common 
understanding on ASEAN plus Japan, China, and the RoK, or on a broader East Asian 
community, will probably emerge as we hold more of these meetings.”294 Koizumi’s 
reluctance to more decisively push for an EAC stems from the Japanese attempt to 
balance against the rise of China and a claimed dominance of China in the APT 
framework. This finally led to the emergence of two competing frameworks to take the 
EAC forward: firstly, the APT process, preferred by the PRC; secondly, an ASEAN+6 
(APT plus Australia, India, New Zealand) framework, preferred by Japan.295 Together 
with the overall deterioration of Japan-PRC and also Japan-RoK relations as pointed out 
in the chapter on reconciliation, “the negotiations on an East Asian community to fall into 
disarray and grind to a halt.”296  
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A fundamental change in Japanese foreign and security policy seemed to be on 
the horizon when in 2009 the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) won the general elections 
and Yukio Hatoyama became Prime Minister of Japan. Even before the election, 
Hatoyama published an article in The New York Times titled “A New Path for Japan.” 
Hatoyama reminded the readers that Japan’s identity is one of being a nation located in 
Asia–he did not say an Asian nation–and “that East Asian region . . . must be recognized 
as Japan’s basic sphere of being.”297 He mentioned rising nationalism, historical and 
cultural conflicts, and conflicting national security interests as reasons for the political 
struggles in the region. These issues could best be addressed through deeper integration 
and engagement in a collective security arrangement. By invoking Count Coudenhove-
Kalergi, he stated his hope that one day his ideas might become reality.298  
During a speech in the Diet in October 2009, Hatoyama affirmed his desire to 
establish relationships with Japan’s East Asian neighbors based on trust and cooperation 
through the identification of common interests and the respect for diverse values and also 
committed himself to further push the realization of the EAC.299 After the APEC summit 
in November 2009 in Singapore, Hatoyama gave a lecture on the Japanese government’s 
policy on Asia–the foundation of which was the initiative for an EAC.300 Hatoyama 
concluded that there was no real bond of fraternity among East Asian nations “because 
reconciliation in the real sense of the word is not necessarily believed to have been 
achieved in this region.”301 He referred to the reconciliation between France and 
Germany after the Second World War as the example he wanted to emulate and declared 
that “the central idea of my ‘East Asian community’ initiative is based upon 
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reconciliation and cooperation in Europe.”302 At their fourth summit in October 2009, 
EAS countries’ leaders appreciated Japan’s reinvigoration of the EAC.  
While there were a couple of scholars who emphasized Japan’s alleged new focus 
on Asia as a positive sign for the future of the region,303 the overall assessment of 
Hatoyama’s approach was considered as some kind of dual hedging that primarily wanted 
to promote Japanese national interests simply in a different way.304 Hatoyama’s aim was 
seen to be balancing against the rising military power of the PRC with help from the 
U.S., while at the same time jumping on the bandwagon of the economic growth of the 
PRC to crank up its own economy. Nonetheless, Hatoyama does not provide a detailed 
roadmap to achieve the EAC which might be due to his emphasis on the content of the 
EAC’s areas of cooperation rather than, for example, on membership criteria. Assuming 
that the diversity of East Asia does not allow for a speedy integration process, the EAC’s 
framework might gradually develop over time.305 While his quest for an Asian identity 
and mechanisms to mediate competing interests lacked some determined political will,306 
his resignation on 8 June 2010307 did not allow him to further pursue his goals. 
The 2012 report of the EAVG represents the latest chapter of the building of an 
EAC. This report was intended as a stocktaking exercise of all APT cooperation measures 
and evaluated the contribution of these measures to the community building in East 
Asia.308 Economic and financial cooperation are estimated to have been the most 
advanced and the report now propagates the new vision of an East Asian Economic 
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Community that should be achieved by 2020. This economic community, however, 
would not entail any curtailment of the member states’ sovereignty, and the report also 
hastens to say that cooperation in the political-security and social-cultural areas remains 
important.309  
Looking at cooperation in the political-security area, the report found that while 
the focus of measures was on confidence building, the overall implementation process of 
the 2007 work plan was uneven and slow.310 Furthermore, positive efforts in the area of 
identity building are not addressed with a single word in the report’s stocktaking section 
because “[t]he progress made in the past decade, however, has yet to establish an East 
Asian identity and deepen regional integration that would realize the vision of an East 
Asia community of peace, prosperity and progress, as presented by the EAVG I.”311 The 
measures proposed under the heading of socio-cultural cooperation that are dealing with 
identity building emphasize that “East Asian countries shall further share their common 
identity through deeper knowledge of regional history.”312 This wording might suggest 
that the struggle for a shared identity has been replaced by the reassuring statement that 
there already is some kind of a shared identity. Again, the usefulness of historical 
knowledge to promote regional identity is questionable since there is no commonly 
accepted view of the region’s recent history. 
A 2009 survey by a Japanese research institution that looked at the nationalistic 
sentiments of the youth in Japan and the PRC revealed that there still existed a mutually 
held perception of hostility between the comparison groups and a diametrically opposed 
perception of the Second World War. The Japanese youth viewed Chinese food safety as 
the major obstacle for closer Japan-PRC relations, followed by territorial disputes; while 
for the Chinese these disputes were the major obstacle, Japan’s historical issues ranked 
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second.313 If one considers “a common identity, shaped and strengthened by shared 
values, ideas, norms, and experiences” to be conducive to regional integration because 
“the manner in which one state’s general populace views another’s will be pivotal in the 
establishing [of] regional cooperation [and] positive images will help reduce historical 
animosity and nationalist sentiment,”314 the prospects for a shared East Asian identity 
might be viewed as dim. 
It appears that the rapid East Asian economic integration did not generate a shared 
East Asian identity that could have replaced national interests or national identities,315 
Such an undertaking might be considered to be an Herculean task when one recalls 
Robert Scalapino’s statement that “the diversities within Asia far exceed the 
commonalities . . . Asia has nowhere near the cultural affinities of West Europe.”316 As it 
turns out, economic integration has been easier to achieve than a political and security 
community.317 The multitude of East Asian forms of bilateral and multilateral security 
cooperation mechanisms are not especially effective, rarely have got a functional end to 
their actions, and the normative blankness of the East Asian security architecture allows 
anything to be interpreted in it.318 On the other hand, further East Asian integration 
seems unavoidable given the progress made so far, the ever-accelerating speed of 
globalization, and the mutual dependence of East Asian countries in economic terms.319 
There is yet no shared identity in NEA that could sufficiently provide the basis for 
a security community. Combining the review of the literature on East Asian/NEA 
security architecture with these findings would favor an increase in multilateral security 
frameworks that are capable of dealing with the complexities of the current and future 
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security environment (energy, environment, terrorism, etc.). These multilateral 
arrangements would not replace but rather supplement the already existing bilateral 
security arrangements. It is these kinds of arrangements into which the countries in the 
region still vest a high level of trust and of which they are–in a time of strategic 
competition between the U.S., Japan, and the PRC–not yet ready to let go.  
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This thesis argued that a shared identity among and reconciliation between the 
intended members of a security community are normative prerequisites for the emergence 
of such a community. By looking at the existing foundations of a shared identity at the 
creation of NATO among its members and the attention that was paid within NATO to 
community building aspects even under the pressure of the Soviet threat, this thesis 
showed that NATO members held a shared identity and were willing to accept constraints 
in order to honor features of security building. Germany was allowed to join this security 
community only after it had seriously reconciled with former wartime enemies and 
victims of the Nazi regime. Both aspects, the existence of a shared identity and a level of 
reconciliation in NEA that would allow for faithful relationships between Japan, the PRC, 
and the ROK are missing in the region. 
The thesis’ first hypothesis argued that the North Atlantic community and NATO as 
its military form of expression with its distinctive organizational features came into being 
not only as a response to the threat posed by the Soviet Union but also due to the deep 
roots of the shared identity among its members. The illustrated findings show that the 
leaders of NATO member states paid attention to the inclusion of community building 
mechanisms in NATO even under immense Soviet pressure. Specific institutional 
elements such as an emphasis on dialogue and the openness for inclusion of other 
countries that supported NATO’s founding principles and contributed to common 
security were inherent in NATO from its creation. These mechanisms contributed to 
NATO’s success, its longevity, and the ability to include former enemies that were 
nevertheless seen as members of a European family of nations. 
The second hypothesis pondered the question of Germany’s reconciliation efforts 
with its wartime enemies and victims of the Nazi regime and held that these efforts were 
a necessary prerequisite for its renewed inclusion in the North Atlantic community of 
nations and NATO. As shown in Chapter III, even if a German contribution to the 
defense of the West against the Soviet Union was crucial in the view of U.S. politicians, 
Germany’s reconciliation with former wartime enemies and victims of the Nazi regime 
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was a necessary prerequisite for its ascendance to NATO. Otherwise, it would not have 
been possible for other NATO members to see Germany as a cognitive extension of 
themselves and to develop a positive shared security identity.  
To allow Germany back into the European family of democratic nations after the 
years of the Nazi regime that had alienated Germany from the rest of Western Europe 
required the reestablishment of Germany as a peaceful, non-revisionist country that is 
guided in its relations with other countries by shared values and norms. Being driven by 
Konrad Adenauer’s conviction that Germany is a Western European country and to 
promote the integration of Germany into the West, the German government undertook 
sincere and continued efforts to reconcile with former wartime enemies and to 
compensate victims of the Nazi regime. Comparing this experience with the efforts made 
towards reconciliation between Japan, the PRC, and the ROK the level of reconciliation 
in NEA can only be described as shallow. The decisive step from shallow to deep 
reconciliation, i.e., the perception of a former enemy as a friend against whom war is 
deemed to be unthinkable, has not yet been made. Even if an all-out war between Japan 
and the PRC is not at the horizon, the conflict over the Senkaku islands shows that the 
restricted use of force between these countries is still an option. 
In the context of these two hypotheses, NATO’s integrated command and force 
structure is thought-provoking. Even if one can argue that an integrated force command 
simply strengthens the military capacity and power of an alliance, it still needs countries 
that are willing to cede some of their national sovereignty and hence some of their very 
own instruments of power. The pre-existing necessity of some kind of community feeling 
seems obvious if one wants to account for the willingness of France to subordinate 
French troops under German command. Had the French still held the perception of 
Germans as hereditary enemies, such a move would not have seemed to be possible. Even 
if further research on this assumption might be necessary, this example in combination 
with other addressed elements like the multilateral nuclear force are strong indicators that 
it required some aspects of security community building and their embrace by NATO 
member states to enable the overall success of NATO and that these community building 
aspects were more important than realized to date. This assumption gets further support 
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from a look at the current bilateral security cooperation between the U.S., Japan, and the 
ROK. Even if the U.S. has been individually maintaining deep relationships with these 
countries for more than 60 years through the hub-and-spokes system of U.S. security 
alliances in East Asia, there is no meaningful multilateral military cooperation among the 
three countries as one entity and also not between Japan and the ROK, while on the other 
hand an integrated command of these three countries’ forces surely would contribute to 
the efficiency of their security cooperation. 
The third hypothesis examined the level of effective institutionalized security 
cooperation in NEA that might entail the curtailment of national sovereignty. The level of 
institutionalization was found to be low, in large measure due to the absence of a shared 
identity among the countries or any positive identification as Northeast Asians. Even if 
East Asian integration has been pushed firstly by economic reasons, and has made good 
progress in the area of economy, trade, or finance, these achievements have not translated 
into the emergence of a deeper identity community. Countries in the region in general, 
and the PRC, in particular, show a strong emphasis on sovereignty and non-interference 
in internal affairs by other states. A curtailment of national sovereignty, however, would 
be necessary, for example, to create integrated military command structures as are the 
case in NATO. 
As an amalgamation of the first three hypotheses, the fourth one claimed that shared 
identity and reconciliation are necessary prerequisites for an NEA security cooperation 
that would be comparable to the North Atlantic experience, but that these are lacking or 
are only insufficiently present in NEA so that the creation of a NATO-like security 
cooperation is inhibited. 
This thesis finds, that the creation of a NATO-like security cooperation based on a 
shared identity and reconciliation between Japan, the PRC, and the ROK does not seem 
very likely to emerge in the medium term. There has not yet been a concept that would 
have created a shared identity among NEA states that would facilitate the positive 
embracement of a we-feeling in the region. The frameworks of Chinese civilizational 
superiority or of a Greater Asia co-prosperity sphere were always based on the 
superiority of one nation over the others.  
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In addition, an unsatisfactory level of reconciliation, competing national 
narratives of the recent past, unresolved territorial conflicts, the rise of the PRC, the 
competition about the leading role in East Asia between the PRC and Japan, and the role 
the U.S. will play in the region impede the origination of a collective security cooperation 
in the region. Behind these evident reasons, however, lies the observation that Japan, the 
PRC, and the ROK might not come close enough to create a security community only 
through the settlement of current disputes. The resolution of these problems is surely 
welcome and most probably even a necessary prerequisite for closer relations among 
these countries–even though the possibility of skipping some of these issues or putting 
them aside for at least a while might be considered and prospects for such an approach 
could be further investigated. At the bottom line, however, the resolution of these issues 
may be a necessary steppingstone towards a more sophisticated security framework in 
NEA.  
A shared identity and a sufficient level of reconciliation–being two normative 
prerequisites of a security community–are lacking in NEA; therefore, NATO-like 
security cooperation cannot emerge in NEA. 
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